

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**JIM E SIROVY**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 16A-UI-11323-JTT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**JELD-WEN INC**  
Employer

**OC: 09/18/16**  
**Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer filed a timely appeal from the October 10, 2016, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits to the claimant provided he was otherwise eligible and that held the employer's account could be charged for benefits, based on an agency conclusion that the claimant was discharged on September 13, 2016 for no disqualifying reason. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on November 3, 2016. Claimant Jim Sirovy participated. Sharon Miller, Human Resources Assistant, represented the employer. The administrative law judge took official notice of the agency's record of benefits disbursed to the claimant. The administrative law judge took official notice of the materials submitted for and generated in connection with the fact-finding interview.

**ISSUES:**

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

Whether the employer's account may be charged.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Jim Sirovy was employed by Jeld-Wen, Inc. on a full-time basis from May 2016 until September 13, 2016, when Mark Shaw, Human Resources Manager, discharged him for attendance. Travis Thompson, Group Manager, communicated the discharge decision to Mr. Sirovy. Mr. Thompson was Mr. Sirovy's immediate supervisor. The final absence that triggered the discharge occurred on September 12, 2016, when Mr. Sirovy was absent due to illness and properly reported the absence to the employer. If Mr. Sirovy needed to be absent from work, the employer's policy required him to notify his supervisor prior to the scheduled start of his shift. Mr. Sirovy was familiar with the absence reporting requirement and followed the policy in reporting his absence on September 12, 2016.

The employer considered six prior absences when making the decision to discharge Mr. Sirovy from the employment. The second most recent absence that factored in the discharge occurred on June 28, 2016, when Mr. Sirovy was absent due to illness and properly reported it to the employer. Following that absence, the employer issued a final written warning for attendance.

The earlier absences considered by the employer were absence due to illness and were properly reported to the employer.

### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See *Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board*, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also *Greene v. EAB*, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See *Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's *unexcused* absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See *Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Employers may not graft on additional requirements to what is an excused absence under the law. See *Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board*, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). For example, an employee's failure to provide a doctor's note in connection with an absence that was due to illness properly reported to the employer will not alter the fact that such an illness would be an excused absence under the law. *Gaborit*, 743 N.W.2d at 557.

The evidence in the record fails to establish any absences that would be unexcused absences under the applicable law. Each of the absences considered by the employer in making the discharge decision was an absence due to illness and was properly reported to the employer. Accordingly, each was an excused absence under the applicable law and cannot be used as a basis for disqualifying Mr. Sirovy for unemployment insurance benefits.

Mr. Sirovy was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, Mr. Sirovy is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits paid to Mr. Sirovy.

**DECISION:**

The October 10, 2016, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged on September 13, 2016 for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

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James E. Timberland  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/rvs