# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**WENDY A HUNTER** 

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-00943-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

**MERCY HOSPITAL** 

Employer

OC: 12/05/10

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct 871 IAC 24.32(8) – Current Act Requirement

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the January 14, 2011, reference 02, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on February 23, 2011. Claimant participated personally and was represented by Attorney Benjamin Merrill. Jenni Grandgeorge represented the employer and presented additional testimony through Cindy Conn. Exhibits A through I and One through Four were received into evidence.

# **ISSUES:**

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

Whether the discharge was based on a current act.

### FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Wendy Hunter was employed by Mercy Hospital as a full-time pharmacy tech until December 3, 2010, when the employer discharged her based on attendance. The final absence that factored in the discharge occurred on October 14, 2010. Between October 14 and December 3, 2010, Ms. Hunter continued to perform her regular duties. The employer waited until December 3, 2010, to notify Ms. Hunter that the absences that occurred on or before October 14, 2010 subjected her to possible or actual discharge from the employment. In the meantime, the employer did some research to determine whether the absences would indeed be covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act. The employer does not know when that research was concluded. At the time of the absences, Ms. Hunter had reasonably concluded that the absences were covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act. This belief had been confirmed by the employer's Health Services department, which approved the absences as covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act at the time Ms. Hunter returned to work after the absences.

# **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See <a href="Lee v. Employment Appeal Board">Lee v. Employment Appeal Board</a>, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See <a href="Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board">Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board</a>, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also <u>Greene v. EAB</u>, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (lowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly

be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's *unexcused* absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See <u>Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984).

The evidence in the record fails to establish a current act of misconduct. The final incident that triggered the discharge occurred on October 14, 2010. The employer waited until December 3, 2010 to notify the claimant that the conduct from on or before October 14 subjected her to possible or actual discharge from the employment. This seven-week delay was unreasonable. Because the discharge was not based on a current act, the discharge cannot serve as a basis for disqualifying the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits. Because there was no current act triggering the discharge, the administrative law judge need not further consider the conduct alleged to have occurred on or before October 14, 2010. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, the claimant is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits paid to the claimant.

## **DECISION:**

The Agency representative's January 14, 2011, reference 02, decision is affirmed. The discharge was not based on a current act. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

James E. Timberland
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed