IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

LISA A NOE 2275 LITTLE SOAP RD BLOOMFIELD IA 52537-8025

OTTUMWA REGIONAL HEALTH CENTER 1001 E PENNSYLVANIA AVE OTTUMWA IA 52501 Appeal Number: 06A-UI-05889-DT

OC: 05/14/06 R: 03 Claimant: Appellant (2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)
,
(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.5-1 – Voluntary Leaving

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Lisa A. Noe (claimant) appealed a representative's May 31, 2006 decision (reference 01) that concluded she was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Ottumwa Regional Health Center, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on June 27, 2006. The claimant participated in the hearing. Janey Huston appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, Monica Kidder. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on October 3, 2005. She worked full time as a registered nurse in the employer's surgical floor. Her last day of work was May 8, 2006. She was released from employment at that time; she was allowed to resign in lieu of being fired. The employer's reason for ending the employment was unsatisfactory job performance.

The employer long had concerns regarding the claimant's adjustment to the surgical floor environment. The claimant had been given a warning on April 7 for not calling a doctor with a lab value. She was informed that she was going to be placed on a 30-day probation. On or about May 4, Ms. Kidder, the director of the floor, informed the claimant that she needed to see great improvement over the next three days. On May 8 Ms. Kidder informed the claimant that the employer was not going to continue the employment. No specific new incidents were alleged to have occurred after the April 7 incident; rather, Ms. Kidder asserted that the claimant generally was having difficulties with multitasking and setting priorities on the busy floor, and that it was not a good fit. No identifiable examples of problems after April 7 were provided, however.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

871 IAC 24.26(21) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(21) The claimant was compelled to resign when given the choice of resigning or being discharged. This shall not be considered a voluntary leaving.

871 IAC 24.25 provides that, in general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated – it is where separation is initiated by the actions of the claimant, not the employer. A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. Bartelt v. Employment Appeal Board, 494 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1993). The claimant did not exhibit the intent to quit and did not act to carry it out. The claimant did not have the intent to sever the employment relationship necessary to treat the separation as a "voluntary quit" for unemployment insurance purposes. The claimant did not have the option to

continue her employment; she could either quit or be discharged. As the separation was not a voluntary quit, it must be treated as a discharge for purposes of unemployment insurance. 871 IAC 24.26(21).

The next issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

- 1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being

limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The reason the employer effectively discharged the claimant was unsatisfactory job performance. First, there is no current act of misconduct as required to establish work-connected misconduct. 871 IAC 24.32(8); Greene v. Employment Appeal Board, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa App. 1988). The only certain incident in question occurred a month prior to the employer's discharge of the claimant. Further, misconduct connotes volition. A failure in job performance is not misconduct unless it is intentional. Huntoon, supra. There is no evidence the claimant intentionally failed to perform to the employer's expectations. The claimant's actions that led to the loss of her job were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's May 31, 2006 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The claimant did not voluntarily quit and the employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

ld/kkf