IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

	68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - El
GEORGE M MCFARLAND	APPEAL NO. 10A-UI-12514-LT
Claimant	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
KAY JO'S Employer	
	OC: 06/20/10

Claimant: Respondent (5)

lowa Code § 96.5(2)a - Discharge for Misconductlowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Leaving - Layoff

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the August 25, 2010 (reference 02) decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on October 28, 2010. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Jeff Miller.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant was laid off due to a lack of work or if he was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant most recently worked part-time as a pizza maker from April 4, 2010 and was separated from employment on April 20, 2010. He was discharged because: "He did not have the job down yet and I didn't want to invest any more money into training him." Business was slow at the time.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

Failure in job performance due to inability or incapacity is not considered misconduct because the actions were not volitional. *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979). Where an individual is discharged due to a failure in job performance, proof of that individual's ability to do the job is required to justify disqualification, rather than accepting the employer's subjective view. To do so is to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the claimant. *Kelly v. IDJS*, 386 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa App. 1986). Since employer agreed that claimant was unable to do the job to his expectation with very limited training over a total of 21 hours' work, and inasmuch as he did attempt to perform the job to the best of his ability but was unable to meet the employer's expectations, no intentional misconduct has been established, as is the employer's burden of proof. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). Accordingly, no disqualification pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a is imposed.

DECISION:

The August 25, 2010 (reference 02) decision is modified without change in effect. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/kjw