# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**DONALD L LAMB** 

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 08A-UI-03456-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DECISION

**GENESIS DEVELOPMENT** 

Employer

OC: 02/10/08 R: 02 Claimant: Appellant (1)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.6-2 - Timeliness of Appeal

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Donald L. Lamb (employer) appealed a representative's February 29, 2008 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Genesis Development (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on April 23, 2008. The claimant participated in the hearing. Kathy Pittman appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, Nick Friess. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

## **ISSUES:**

Was the claimant's appeal timely? Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

### FINDINGS OF FACT:

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on February 29, 2008. The claimant did not remember if he had received the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by March 10, 2008. The appeal was not filed until it was hand delivered to a local Agency office on April 9, 2008, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. The claimant had allowed his claim to lapse for a period of time due to health issues, and learned of the disqualification decision when he attempted to reopen his claim.

After working for the predecessor operator of the business, the claimant started working for the employer when the employer took over the business on January 1, 2008. He worked full time (32 hours per week) as a work supervisor at the employer's recycling center providing vocational work services to disabled adults. His last day of work was February 6, 2008. The employer discharged him on that date. The stated reason for the discharge was smoking inside the facility after prior warnings.

The employer has a strict no-smoking policy within its facilities. For the facility in which the claimant worked in particular, there is a particular danger given the quantity of paper from the recycling process. In discussions in December 2007 in preparation for the employer taking over the business the employer had advised the claimant that the employer would not allow him to continue smoking inside the facility, that any smoking had to be entirely outside. On January 15 and on January 16, 2008, Ms. Pittman, the operations manager, encountered the claimant smoking while standing in the building doorway. She advised him again that any smoking had to be completely outside of the building, and that further violations of the policy could result in discharge.

On February 6 Ms. Pittman found that the claimant had been smoking in a work area of the facility. As a result of this additional violation, the claimant was discharged.

## **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the claimant timely appealed the representative's decision.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

While it is still possible that the claimant did receive the representative's decision and then lost and forgot it, it cannot be sufficiently established that the claimant did in fact receive the decision. If he did not receive the decision, he did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that the appeal should be treated as timely filed pursuant to lowa Code § 96.6-2. Therefore, the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979); <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979), and <u>Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

- 1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
  - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
  - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
  - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
  - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
    - 1. The employer's interest, or
    - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

## Henry, supra.

The claimant's smoking inside the facility after repeated warnings shows a willful or wanton disregard of the standard of behavior the employer has the right to expect from an employee, as well as an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests and of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. The employer discharged the claimant for reasons amounting to work-connected misconduct.

### **DECISION:**

The representative's February 29, 2008 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer discharged the claimant for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits as of February 6, 2008. This disqualification continues until the claimant has been paid ten times his weekly benefit amount for insured work, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account will not be charged.

Lynette A. F. Donner
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

Id/pjs