IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

## JEFFERY W FUNK 604 E 23<sup>RD</sup> ST S NEWTON IA 50208

SWIFT & COMPANY <sup>C</sup>/<sub>o</sub> EMPLOYERS UNITY INC PO BOX 749000 ARVADA CO 80006-9000

# Appeal Number:04A-UI-11089-LTOC:09-19-04R:O2Claimant:Appellant(2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.* 

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

#### STATE CLEARLY

- 1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a - Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Claimant filed a timely appeal from the October 5, 2004, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on November 5, 2004. Claimant did participate. Employer did participate through Jeremy Cook.

## FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time electrician through September 19, 2004 when he was discharged. At approximately 4:30 a.m. on September 19, his supervisor, Frank Stanton, found him in the transformer room. Claimant was reclined and had his eyes closed to rest, as he was tired and nervous about working on a live electrical substation as any errors could be fatal. Claimant was required to work seven days per week, often more than one shift totaling 12 hours in addition to

mandatory training three days per week. Stanton asked claimant what he was doing and claimant replied he was resting. Claimant had not yet taken his break that shift. No prior warnings about this issue have been issued. Stanton did not participate in the hearing.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v.</u> <u>Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not

necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. <u>Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. <u>Miller v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

The incident that led to his separation was an isolated incident and claimant told his supervisor that he was tired and did not feel safe working on the live substation. His request for a break was reasonable and his supervisor's denial was unreasonable especially given a mandatory seven-day workweek. Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about any of the issues leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or negligently. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written) and reasonable notice should be given. Certainly, the bounds of reasonable employer expectations were exceeded in this situation. Benefits are allowed.

## DECISION:

The October 5, 2004, reference 01, decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

dml/tjc