

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

**HARRY LUCAS**  
Claimant

**KMB PROPERTY MANAGEMENT II, LLC**  
Employer

**APPEAL 20A-UI-06357-ED-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**OC: 03/15/20**  
**Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting  
Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The Claimant filed an appeal from the June 12, 2020 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits to claimant. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on July 21, 2020 at 9:00 AM. The claimant, Harry Lucas, participated. The employer, KMB Property Management II, LLC participated through witness Liz King.

**ISSUES:**

Did claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to employer?  
Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a lawn care employee. Claimant began working for this employer on June 4, 2018. Jesse Clark was claimant's immediate supervisor. Claimant's last day physically working at the job was May 7, 2020. Claimant's shift was 8:00 am – 5:00 pm Monday through Friday and weekends as needed. The schedule could potentially be altered due to weather. If the shift would be different from the regular 8:00 am – 5:00 pm shift, claimant would be notified by Jesse Clark.

On May 7, 2020, claimant left work at 4:00 pm, which was one hour before his shift was scheduled to end. Claimant received a text message from Mr. Clark asking if he was available that evening to finish work. Claimant responded that he was not available and he would not be coming back to work due to personal reasons. At the time, claimant did not explain in detail why he was not able to go back to work. Claimant reported back to work on May 8 and was informed he was fired for refusing to complete his work on May 7.

Claimant had not received any disciplinary actions or write-ups prior to May 7, 2020.

## REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

As a preliminary matter, I find that Claimant did not quit. Claimant was discharged from employment.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).

What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The focus of the administrative code definition of misconduct is on deliberate, intentional or culpable acts by the employee. *Id.* When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Further, poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Unemployment statutes should be interpreted liberally to achieve the legislative goal of minimizing the burden of involuntary unemployment." *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1982). The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Id.* at 11. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. *Id.* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its

rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989).

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 or because it was not "properly reported." *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 (Iowa 1984) and *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). Excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982).

The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 190 (Iowa 1984). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping is not considered excused. *Id.* at 191. Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10-11 (Iowa 1982).

Absences in good faith, for good cause, with appropriate notice, are not misconduct. *Id.* at 10. They may be grounds for discharge but not for disqualification of benefits because substantial disregard for the employer's interest is not shown and this is essential to a finding of misconduct. *Id.*

Excessive absenteeism has been found when there has been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929\*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable.

Two absences would be the minimum amount in order to determine whether these repeated acts were excessive. Further, in the cases of absenteeism it is the law, not the employer's attendance policies, which determines whether absences are excused or unexcused. *Gaborit*, 743 N.W.2d at 557-58 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

An employee's failure to perform a specific task may not constitute misconduct if such failure is in good faith or for good cause. *Woods v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 327 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa 1982). The reasonableness of the employer's request in light of the circumstances, along with the worker's reason for non-compliance must be analyzed. *Endicott v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 367 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). Good faith is measured by an objective standard of reasonableness and the key question is "what a reasonable person would have believed under the circumstances." *Aalbers v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 431 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Iowa 1988)

The reason claimant was discharged was due to his failure to work his entire shift on May 7, 2020. He did not finish his work on this date because he had a family emergency. One absence is clearly not excessive. However, a single absence, in some cases, can be considered misconduct.


Misconduct can be shown in a single absence case based on things such as the nature of an employee's work, the effect of the employee's absence, dishonesty or falsification by the employee in regard to the unexcused absence, and whether the employee made any attempt to notify the employer of the absence. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d at 897. Here, the claimant was a lawn care worker who the business relied upon to perform work for its customers. This clearly has a detrimental effect of the business itself when it was unable to rely on claimant to perform the lawn care work.

However, claimant notified Jesse Clark that he was not going back to work. He was honest in providing a reason why he was not going to be at work, which was a personal issue. Claimant did not communicate details of the personal issue at the time to Jesse Clark. Nonetheless, claimant had never failed to go to work before. A reasonable person would have believed that under the circumstances, Claimant's refusal to work on this single occasion was due to claimant's emergent personal issue. A single absence due to personal/family issue that must be handled is good cause.

As such, the employer has failed to prove that claimant was discharged for any current act of job-related misconduct that would disqualify him from receiving benefits. Benefits are allowed.

**DECISION:**

The June 12, 2020 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible.

A handwritten signature in dark ink on a light-colored background. The signature reads "Emily Drenkow Carr" in a cursive, flowing script.

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Emily Drenkow Carr  
Administrative Law Judge

July 31, 2020  
Decision Dated and Mailed

ed/scn