

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**LEVI I SWANSON**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 10A-UI-14699-LT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL INC  
MANPOWER TEMPORARY SERVICES**  
Employer

**OC: 08/15/10  
Claimant: Appellant (4)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(1)a – Voluntary Leaving – Other Employment  
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The claimant filed an appeal from the October 6, 2010 (reference 02) decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on December 13, 2010. Claimant participated. Employer participated through staffing specialist, Gail Gonyaw.

**ISSUE:**

The issue is whether claimant's appeal is timely and if claimant voluntarily left the employment with good cause attributable to the employer.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A disqualification decision was mailed to claimant's last-known address of record on October 6, 2010. Claimant did not recall when he received the decision, other than it was "a few days," "three or four days" before he filed the appeal on October 22, 2010. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by October 16, 2010.

Claimant most recently worked full time as a temporary satellite dish installer assigned at Wineguard for Manpower and was separated from employment on June 19, 2010. He continued to work at Wineguard through Temp Associates when the client contract was transferred to Temp Associates. He filed a claim when he was later separated from Temp Associates.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

The first issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the claimant's appeal is timely. The administrative law judge determines it is.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The claimant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received in a timely fashion. Without timely notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Employment Security Commission*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The claimant filed the appeal within four days of receipt. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant voluntarily left the employment to accept employment elsewhere.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

a. The individual left employment in good faith for the sole purpose of accepting other or better employment, which the individual did accept, and the individual performed services in the new employment. Benefits relating to wage credits earned with the employer that the individual has left shall be charged to the unemployment compensation fund. This paragraph applies to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

871 IAC 24.28(5) provides:

Voluntary quit requalifications and previously adjudicated voluntary quit issues.

(5) The claimant shall be eligible for benefits even though the claimant voluntarily quit if the claimant left for the sole purpose of accepting an offer of other or better employment, which the claimant did accept, and from which the claimant is separated, before or after having started the new employment.

871 IAC 23.43(5) provides:

(5) Sole purpose. The claimant shall be eligible for benefits even though the claimant voluntarily quit if the claimant left for the sole purpose of accepting an offer of other or better employment, which the claimant did accept, and from which the claimant is separated, before or after having started the new employment. No charge shall accrue to the account of the former voluntarily quit employer.

Even though the separation was without good cause attributable to the employer and would, standing alone, disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits, the claimant did leave in order to accept other employment and did perform services for the subsequent employer. Accordingly, benefits are allowed and the account of the employer shall not be charged.

**DECISION:**

The October 6, 2010 (reference 02) decision is modified in favor of the appellant. The claimant voluntarily left his employment in order to accept other employment. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. The account of the employer (account number 265624) shall not be charged.

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Dévon M. Lewis  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

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