IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

KENYATA L BURNETT

Claimant

APPEAL 20A-UI-07188-AD-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ALDI INC

Employer

OC: 04/12/20

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On June 29, 2020, Aldi Inc (employer) filed an appeal from the June 19, 2020 (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits.

A telephone hearing was held on August 5, 2020. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. Employer participated by Hearing Representative Frankie Patterson. District Manager Meghan Hoben participated as a witness for employer. Kenyata Burnett (claimant/respondent) participated personally.

Official notice was taken of the administrative record.

ISSUE(S):

I. Was the separation a layoff, discharge for misconduct, or voluntary quit without good cause?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

Claimant worked for employer as a full-time store associate. Claimant's first day of employment was December 5, 2019. The last day claimant worked on the job was January 5, 2020. Claimant separated from employment on January 12, 2020. Claimant was discharged on that date.

Claimant was discharged for absenteeism. Claimant began feeling ill on January 5, 2020. She called her manager prior to her shift starting on January 6 to report she would not be in to work that day. Claimant did not call in at least four hours prior to her shift starting, as required by employer's attendance policy. Claimant was aware of this policy, as it was covered during her training.

Claimant saw a doctor on January 6 and was diagnosed with influenza. Claimant informed her manager later that day that her doctor had excused her from work for 10-14 days, depending on how quickly she could recover. The manager told claimant she could not be off for that long and

suggested she return on January 10. The manager also told claimant she would have to find coverage for her shift on January 9. Claimant told the manager she did not yet know anyone at work or have numbers for coworkers yet, as she had just recently begun work there. The manager responded that she had found coverage for that shift but claimant would have to work January 11 for the person who covered claimant's January 9 shift.

The manager contacted claimant prior to her shift on January 10. The manager was unable to get ahold of claimant and so filled the shift. Claimant later contacted the manager and told her she would be unable to work the shift on January 11, as she still was not feeling well. The manager told her she would need to find coverage. Claimant did not request contact information for coworkers to try to get the shift covered. Claimant did not come into work as scheduled on January 11.

Claimant was scheduled to work January 12. She did not call in or report for that shift. Claimant told the manager that she did not come in because she did not know she was scheduled to work that day. Schedules are released two weeks in advance and posted for employees to see. However, claimant did not know she was scheduled to work because she had not been into work for approximately a week and did not typically look that far ahead on the schedule when she reviewed it. After this absence, the manager contacted claimant to inform her she had been discharged.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons set forth below, the June 19, 2020 (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits is AFFIRMED.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32 provides in relevant part:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency,

unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer bears the burden of proving that a claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits because of substantial misconduct within the meaning of Iowa Code section 96.5(2). *Myers v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 462 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman, Id.* In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. *Newman, Id.*

When reviewing an alleged act of misconduct, the finder of fact may consider past acts of misconduct to determine the magnitude of the current act. *Kelly v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 386 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa Ct. App.1986). However, conduct asserted to be disqualifying misconduct must be both specific and current. *West v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 489 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1992); *Greene v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Because our unemployment compensation law is designed to protect workers from financial hardships when they become unemployed through no fault of their own, we construe the provisions "liberally to carry out its humane and beneficial purpose." *Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 570 N.W.2d 85, 96 (Iowa 1997). "[C]ode provisions which operate to work a forfeiture of benefits are strongly construed in favor of the claimant." *Diggs v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 478 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).

In order to show misconduct due to absenteeism, the employer must establish the claimant had excessive absences that were unexcused. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness or injury cannot constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly

reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (lowa 1984).

Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the absences were unexcused. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness are excused, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871- 24.32(7); *Cosper, supra*; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit, supra*. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins, supra*. However, a good faith inability to obtain childcare for a sick infant may be excused. *McCourtney v. Imprimis Tech., Inc.*, 465 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).

The second step in the analysis is to determine whether the unexcused absences were excessive. Excessive absenteeism has been found when there have been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable.

Employer has not carried its burden of proving claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits because of a current act of substantial misconduct within the meaning of Iowa Code section 96.5(2).

Claimant's absence on January 6 was unexcused. Claimant did not call in to report her absence on that date at least four hours prior to her shift starting, as required by employer's policy. She had a reasonable opportunity to do so, as she began feeling ill on January 5 and went to the doctor the following day.

On that same date, claimant reported to her manager that she would be absent for 10-14 days due to her influenza diagnosis. Employer was within its rights to require her to find coverage for subsequent shifts and to even schedule her for an additional shift during that timeframe. It was within its rights to then discharge her for failing to work or find coverage for those shifts. However, that does not render those absences unexcused for purposes of unemployment insurance law.

Claimant informed employer well in advance of those subsequent shifts – on January 6 and on subsequent occasions - that she was ill and unable to work those shifts. Properly reported absences for good cause reasons, such as illness, are not considered unexcused. Therefore, claimant had just a single unexcused absence prior to being discharged. It is axiomatic that a single unexcused absence is not excessive. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The June 19, 2020 (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits is AFFIRMED. The separation from employment was not disqualifying. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is not otherwise disqualified or ineligible. Employer's account is subject to charge.

Andrew B. Duffelmeyer

Administrative Law Judge

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August 13, 2020

Decision Dated and Mailed

abd/sam