IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

KEELER, WESLEY, G

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-04356-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

TPI IOWA LLC TPI IOWA Employer

OC: 03/17/13

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) - Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Wesley Keeler filed a timely appeal from the April 3, 2013, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on May 13, 2013. Mr. Keeler did not respond to the hearing notice instructions to provide a telephone number for the hearing and did not participate. Danielle Williams, Human Resources Coordinator, represented the employer. Exhibits 2 through 12 were received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether Mr. Keeler was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies him for unemployment insurance benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Wesley Keeler was employed by TPI lowa as a full-time production worker from 2011 until March 12, 2013, when the employer discharged him for attendance. The final absence that triggered the discharge occurred on March 8, 2013, when Mr. Keeler was late for personal reasons. Mr. Keeler had an ongoing problem with transportation to work. Mr. Keeler had also been late getting to work for personal reasons on June 10, July 1 and 15, September 21, and October 9, 2012 and on January 24, 2013. Mr. Keeler had additional absences for personal reasons on June 4, August 12, 23, 25, and 30, September 19 and 27, October 26, November 6, and December 11, 13, 24, and 28, 2012, and on January 18 and 31 and March 6, 2013. Mr. Keeler had additional absences, due to illness properly reported to the employer, on September 12, 2012 and February 7, 2013. The employer issued several warnings for tardiness and other attendance issues during the last several months of the employment.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also Greene v. EAB, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (lowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. lowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (lowa 1976).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's *unexcused* absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of

whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See <u>Higgins v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 350 N.W.2d 187 (lowa 1984). Employers may not graft on additional requirements to what is an excused absence under the law. See <u>Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 743 N.W.2d 554 (lowa Ct. App. 2007). For example, an employee's failure to provide a doctor's note in connection with an absence that was due to illness properly reported to the employer will not alter the fact that such an illness would be an excused absence under the law. <u>Gaborit</u>, 743 N.W.2d at 557.

The evidence in the record establishes 23 unexcused absences between June 4, 2012 and March 8, 2013. Most, if not all, of the unexcused absences were attributable to lack of adequate transportation, a matter the law deems a matter of personal responsibility. Only the absences on September 12, 2012 and February 7, 2013 were excused absences under the applicable law. The pattern of unexcused absences occurred in the context of repeated warnings for tardiness and other attendance issues. The unexcused absences were excessive and constituted misconduct in connection with the employment.

Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that Mr. Keeler was discharged for misconduct. Accordingly, Mr. Keeler is disqualified for benefits until he has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account shall not be charged for benefits paid to Mr. Keeler.

DECISION:

The Agency representative's April 3, 2013, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged for misconduct. The claimant is disqualified for unemployment benefits until he has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit allowance, provided he meets all other eligibility requirements. The employer's account will not be charged.

James E. Timberland
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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