IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 **DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE**

68-0157 (7-97) - 3091078 - EI

JESSICA J GOREHAM 3388 PEARL ST **MUSCATINE IA 52761**

HY-VEE INC ^c/_o TALX UC EXPRESS **PO BOX 283** ST LOUIS MO 63166-0283

HY-VEE INC ^C/_O TALX UCM SERVICES INC 3799 VILLAGE RUN DR #511 DES MOINES IA 50317

05A-UI-03503-DT **Appeal Number:**

OC: 11/21/04 R: 04 Claimant: Respondent (2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor-Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)
(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge 871 IAC 26.14(7) - Late Call Section 96.3-7 – Recovery of Overpayment of Benefits

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Hy-Vee, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's March 25, 2005 decision (reference 03) that concluded Jessica J. Goreham (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held at 2:00 p.m. on April 25, 2005. The claimant failed to respond to the hearing notice and provide a telephone number at which she could be reached for the hearing and did not participate in the hearing. David Williams of TALX UC Express appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from three witnesses, Steve Graham, Tom Kuan, and Beverly Haller. The record was closed at 2:17 p.m. At 2:18 p.m., the claimant called the Appeals Section and requested that the record be

reopened. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the employer, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Should the hearing record be reopened? Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant received the hearing notice prior to the April 25, 2005 hearing. The instructions inform the parties that if the party does not contact the Appeals Section and provide the phone number at which the party can be contacted for the hearing, the party will not be called for the hearing. The first time the claimant directly contacted the Appeals Section was on April 25, 2005, 18 minutes after the scheduled start time for the hearing. The claimant had not read all the information on the hearing notice, and had assumed that the Appeals Section would initiate the telephone contact even without a response to the hearing notice.

The claimant started working for the employer on May 8, 2004. She worked part-time (4 to 8 hours per week) as a Chinese deli clerk at the employer's Muscatine, Iowa store. Her last day of work was February 6, 2005. The employer discharged her on that date. The stated reason for the discharge was insubordination and creating disruption in front of customers.

On that date, the claimant's supervisor, Mr. Kuan, was attempting to inform the claimant that she was not sacking the product correctly. The claimant became upset and began yelling that she had always done it this way. The claimant continued to yell and make a commotion and flailing her hands around, to the point where customers at the pizza department and Ms. Haller, the clerk at the pizza counter, could hear the commotion and were distracted by the claimant's behavior. The claimant was then discharged.

The claimant established a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective November 21, 2004. She filed an additional claim effective January 6, 2005. The claimant has received unemployment insurance benefits after the separation from employment in the amount of \$285.00.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue in this case is whether the claimant's request to reopen the hearing should be granted or denied.

871 IAC 26.14(7) provides:

- (7) If a party has not responded to a notice of telephone hearing by providing the appeals section with the names and telephone numbers of its witnesses by the scheduled time of the hearing, the presiding officer may proceed with the hearing.
- a. If an absent party responds to the hearing notice while the hearing is in progress, the presiding officer shall pause to admit the party, summarize the hearing to that point, administer the oath, and resume the hearing.

- b. If a party responds to the notice of hearing after the record has been closed and any party which has participated is no longer on the telephone line, the presiding officer shall not take the evidence of the late party. Instead, the presiding officer shall inquire as to why the party was late in responding to the notice of hearing. For good cause shown, the presiding officer shall reopen the record and cause further notice of hearing to be issued to all parties of record. The record shall not be reopened if the presiding officer does not find good cause for the party's late response to the notice of hearing.
- c. Failure to read or follow the instructions on the notice of hearing shall not constitute good cause for reopening the record.

The first time the claimant called the Appeals Section for the April 25, 2003 hearing was after the hearing had been closed. Although the claimant intended to participate in the hearing, the she failed to read or follow the hearing notice instructions and did not contact the Appeals Section prior to the hearing. The rule specifically states that failure to read or follow the instructions on the hearing notice does not constitute good cause to reopen the hearing. The claimant did not establish good cause to reopen the hearing. Therefore, the claimant's request to reopen the hearing is denied.

The substantive issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being

limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The claimant's behavior toward her supervisor and within the sight and vision of customers shows a willful or wanton disregard of the standard of behavior the employer has the right to expect from an employee, as well as an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests and of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. The employer discharged the claimant for reasons amounting to work-connected misconduct.

Iowa Code section 96.3-7 provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

Because the claimant's separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which the claimant was not entitled. Those benefits must be recovered in accordance with the provisions of lowa law.

DECISION:

The representative's March 25, 2005 decision (reference 03) is reversed. The employer discharged the claimant for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits as of February 6, 2005. This disqualification continues until the claimant has been paid ten times her weekly benefit amount for insured work, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account will not be charged. The claimant is overpaid benefits in the amount of \$285.00.

ld/sc