# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

ROBERT L SCHROEDER

Claimant

**APPEAL 20A-UI-11658-AW-T** 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

THEISENS INC

Employer

OC: 06/14/20

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quitting

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Filing – Timely Appeal

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35 - Filing

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Claimant filed an appeal from the August 17, 2020 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on November 9, 2020, at 1:00 p.m. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Tasha Blindert, Human Resources Assistant. No exhibits were admitted. Official notice was taken of the administrative record.

#### **ISSUES:**

Whether claimant's separation was a discharge for disqualifying job-related misconduct or a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to employer.

Whether claimant filed a timely appeal.

# **FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The Unemployment Insurance Decision was mailed to claimant at the correct address on August 17, 2020. Claimant does not recall when the decision was received. The decision states that it becomes final unless an appeal is postmarked or received by Iowa Workforce Development Appeals Section by August 27, 2020. Claimant appealed the decision online on September 21, 2020. The appeal was received by Iowa Workforce Development on September 21, 2020. Claimant recalls two to three days passed between receiving the decision in the mail and submitting his appeal.

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge further finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time Automotive Service Technician from August 20, 2019 until his employment with Theisens ended on April 28, 2020. Claimant last performed work for employer on April 24, 2020. Claimant was scheduled to work on April 27, 2020 and April 28, 2020 but was unable to work due to illness. Claimant's illness made him physically unable to notify employer of his absences. Claimant's father called employer on claimant's behalf and notified whomever answered the call of claimant's absences.

Employer has a policy that two consecutive absences without notice is considered job abandonment. The policy is outlined in the employee handbook. Claimant received a copy of the handbook. On April 28, 2020, employer considered claimant to have abandoned his employer per the policy. Claimant had no intention of quitting his employment. Claimant had no prior warnings regarding attendance.

### REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes that claimant's appeal was timely.

lowa Code § 96.6(2) provides, in pertinent part: "[u]nless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision."

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(1) provides:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided by statute or by division rule, any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document submitted to the division shall be considered received by and filed with the division:
- (a) If transmitted via the United States Postal Service on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark, or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it is received; or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion.
- (b) If transmitted via the State Identification Date Exchange System (SIDES), maintained by the United States Department of Labor, on the date it was submitted to SIDES.
- (c) If transmitted by any means other than [United States Postal Service or the State Identification Data Exchange System (SIDES)], on the date it is received by the division.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(2) provides:

2. The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the division that the delay in submission was due to division error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service.

The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott* 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982).

Claimant did not receive the decision prior to the deadline. Upon receiving the decision, claimant submitted his appeal within two to three days. Claimant's delay in submitting his appeal was due to delay of the United States Postal Service. Claimant's appeal is considered timely.

The next issue to be determined is whether claimant's separation is disqualifying. For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant did not voluntarily quit his employment; claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

lowa unemployment insurance law disqualifies claimants who voluntarily quit employment without good cause attributable to the employer. Iowa Code §§ 96.5(1). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(4) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(4) The claimant was absent for three days without giving notice to employer in violation of company rule.

Where there is no expressed intention or act to sever the employment relationship, the case must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (lowa Ct. App. 1992).

In this case, claimant was not absent without notice for three consecutive shifts and had no intention of terminating his employment relationship with Theisens. Therefore, claimant did not voluntarily quit his employment; and his separation from employment must be analyzed as a discharge.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)(a) provides:

An individual shall be *disqualified for benefits:* 

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)(a) provides:

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition of misconduct has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Reigelsberger v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993); *accord Lee v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Iowa 2000). Further, the employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 350 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Iowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10.

Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose

discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 9; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. See Gaborit, 734 N.W.2d at 555-558. An employer's no-fault absenteeism policy or point system is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits.

If a claimant does not notify employer of an absence prior to the beginning of work, the absence may still be excused if the lack of notice was due to the claimant's physical inability to notify the employer. See Gimbel v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 489 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (a claimant's late call to the employer was justified because the claimant, who was suffering from an asthma attack, was physically unable to call the employer until the condition sufficiently improved). Unreported absences are not considered misconduct when the claimant's failure to notify the employer of the absence is caused by the claimant's mental incapacity. See Roberts v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 356 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1984).

Claimant's absences on April 27, 2020 and April 28, 2020 were due to illness, which is considered reasonable grounds. Claimant did not notify employer of each absence because his illness made him physically unable to notify employer. Therefore, claimant's absences are considered excused and do not constitute misconduct. Without a current or final act of misconduct, the history of other absences need not be examined. Employer has not met its burden of proving disqualifying, job-related misconduct. Claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed if claimant is otherwise eligible.

# **DECISION:**

Claimant's appeal was timely. The August 17, 2020 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

Adrienne C. Williamson

Administrative Law Judge

Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau

Iowa Workforce Development

1000 East Grand Avenue

Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209

Fax (515)478-3528

\_\_<u>November 23, 2020</u>\_

**Decision Dated and Mailed** 

acw/mh