IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

ROBIN L GOLDEN

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-08896-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

HOLLYWOOD ENTERTAINMENT

Employer

OC: 06/20/10

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Leaving 871 IAC 24.26(19) – Voluntary Leaving – Spot Jobs/Casual Labor 871 IAC 24.26(22) – Voluntary Leaving – Specific Period of Time Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the June 22, 2011 (reference 03) decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on July 29, 2011. Claimant participated. Employer did not respond to the hearing notice instructions and did not participate. Department's Exhibit D-1 was admitted to the record.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant's appeal is timely and if she voluntarily left the employment with good cause attributable to the employer.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's address of record on June 22, 2011. She did receive the decision prior to the appeal deadline and filed her appeal by mail on June 28, 2011, prior to the July 2, 2011 deadline. She found out on July 7, 2011 that the appeal was not received and faxed another the same day.

The claimant was hired for a spot job or casual labor for five days to box up fixtures. She completed the work assignment. There was no further work available from this employer.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the claimant's appeal is timely. The administrative law judge determines it is.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5. except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary guit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8. subsection 5.

The claimant filed an appeal in a timely manner but it was not received. Immediately upon receipt of information to that effect, a second appeal was filed. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant's separation was not the result of a disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

871 IAC 24.26(19) and (22) provide:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a

voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of lowa Code § 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of lowa Code § 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

(22) The claimant was hired for a specific period of time and completed the contract of hire by working until this specific period of time had lapsed. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of lowa Code § 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employees shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

Inasmuch as the claimant completed the contract of hire with the employer as contemplated, no disqualification is imposed.

DECISION:

dml/css

The June 22, 2011 (reference 03), decision is reversed. The claimant's appeal was timely. Her separation from employment with Hollywood Entertainment was for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	