IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

LISA M EDWARDS

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 20A-UI-00330-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

CITYWIDE CLEANERS INC

Employer

OC: 04/28/19

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code Section 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal Iowa Code Section 95.5(2)(a) – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a late appeal from the December 30, 2019, reference 02, decision that allowed benefits to the claimant provided she was otherwise eligible and that held the employer's account could be charged for benefits, based on the deputy's conclusion that the claimant was discharged on December 2, 2019 for no disqualifying reason. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on January 30, 2020. The claimant participated. David Brighton represented the employer. Exhibit 1 and Department Exhibit D-1 were received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the appeal was timely. Whether there is good cause to treat the appeal as timely.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: On December 30, 2019, Iowa Workforce Development mailed the December 30, 2019, reference 02, decision to the employer's last-known address of record. The December 30, 2019, reference 02, decision allowed benefits to the claimant provided she was otherwise eligible and held the employer's account could be charged for benefits, based on the deputy's conclusion that the claimant was discharged on December 2, 2019 for no disqualifying reason. The decision stated than an appeal from the decision must be postmarked by January 9, 2020 or be received by the Appeals Bureau by that date. The employer received the decision in a timely manner, prior to the deadline for appeal. On January 10, 2020, the business owner forwarded the decision to manager David Brighton. On January 10, 2020, Mr. Brighton completed an online appeal. The Appeals Bureau received the electronically transmitted appeal on January 10, 2020.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

A representative designated by the director shall Initial determination. promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten-day deadline for appeal begins to run on the date Workforce Development mails the decision to the parties. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the Agency representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (lowa 1976).

An appeal submitted by mail is deemed filed on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it was received, or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion. See Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.35(1)(a). See also *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). An appeal submitted by any other means is deemed filed on the date it is received by the Unemployment Insurance Division of Iowa Workforce Development. See Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.35(1)(b).

The evidence in the record establishes that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (lowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (lowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (lowa 1982). The question in this case thus

becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (lowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (lowa 1973).

The employer's appeal was untimely. The employer received the decision in a timely manner and had a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. Due to delay within the employer's operations and attributable to the employer, the employer failed to file an appeal by the January 9, 2020 appeal deadline and instead filed the appeal one day after the appeal deadline. Because the late filing of the appeal was attributable to the employer, and not attributable to lowa Workforce Development or the United States Postal Service, there is not good cause to treat the late appeal as a timely appeal. See Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.35(2). Because the appeal was untimely, the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to disturb the December 30, 2019, reference 02, decision. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

DECISION:

The December 30, 2019, reference 02, decision is affirmed. The employer's appeal was untimely. The decision that allowed benefits to the claimant provided she was otherwise eligible and that held the employer's account could be charged for benefits, based on the deputy's conclusion that the claimant was discharged on December 2, 2019 for no disqualifying reason, remains in effect.

James E. Timberland
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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