IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (0-06) - 3001078 - EL

	00-0137 (8-00) - 3031070 - 21
GEORGE J MURPHY Claimant	APPEAL NO: 09A-UI-15546-DT
	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS CORP Employer	
	OC: 09/20/09 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

George J. Murphy (claimant) appealed a representative's October 15, 2009 decision (reference 02) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on November 18, 2009. The claimant participated in the hearing. Alicia Alonzo appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on October 2, 2007. He worked full time as a production worker in the employer's Ottumwa, Iowa pork processing facility. His last day of work was February 25, 2009. The employer discharged him on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was a third violation of misuse of company time.

The claimant's first two warnings came on July 29 and November 12, 2008. On the first occasion he was in the locker room without a pass during production time. On the second occasion he was again in the locker room, but in this instance he had asked his lead person for permission to go and put away his cell phone. The warning in that case was either because he had not asked someone higher than the lead person, that he should not have needed to take time away to put away his cell phone, or because the manager who saw him was not aware he had asked the lead to go to the break room.

The third alleged incident was on February 25. The employer asserted that the claimant was ten minutes late getting to his workstation. The claimant clocked in with adequate time. The reason he was somewhat delayed in getting to his workstation, which was near the start of the production line, was that he was in line getting fresh equipment in which to work. He had made

sure that a utility worker was covering the workstation while he was getting fresh equipment. No evidence was presented that the claimant was doing anything other than waiting to get fresh equipment that would have delayed his arrival at this workstation. No evidence was presented to suggest the employer's expectation was that the claimant was to be at this workstation by the scheduled start time for the shift, as compared to simply being clocked in by his scheduled start time.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. <u>Cosper v. IDJS</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Henry</u>, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is the alleged misuse of company time. Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was misusing company time on February 25. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's October 15, 2009 decision (reference 02) is reversed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs