

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

**MARIA E PEREZ**  
Claimant

**PELLA CORPORATION**  
Employer

**APPEAL 17A-UI-11445-DG-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**OC: 10/15/17**  
**Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Claimant filed an appeal from a decision of a representative dated November 2, 2017, (reference 01) that held claimant ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. After due notice, a hearing was scheduled for and held on December 15, 2017. Claimant participated personally with the assistance of a Spanish interpreter, and was represented by Mary C. Hamilton, Attorney at Law. Employer participated by Amber Jaworski, Human Resources Manager. Employer's Exhibits 1-7 and Claimant's Exhibits A-E were admitted into evidence.

**ISSUE:**

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds: Claimant last worked for employer on October 10, 2017. Employer discharged claimant on October 18, 2017, because claimant was not able to perform job related tasks in a satisfactory manner.

Claimant began working for employer on January 5, 2017. Claimant was employed as a full-time Operator. Claimant's job involved lifting boards and other items that had to be fitted and tacked down. The boards weighed only a few pounds, but the job involved repetitious movement.

On or about April 5, 2017, claimant reported a shoulder injury to employer. At first claimant received therapy at the facility, but claimant's symptoms persisted and became progressively worse. In June, 2017 claimant's shoulder pain became unbearable, and she heard a crack while she was performing job-related duties. Claimant was sent to employer's occupational health center for further treatment. Claimant was then placed on light duty until July 12, 2017.

While claimant was on light duty she was asked to lift heavy bundles of boards above her head. The work was not as repetitive, but the mass she was lifting was much greater. Claimant felt that the light duty work was actually causing her more pain and injury than working on the line.

On July 12, 2017 when claimant saw the occupational physician she asked to be placed back on regular duty. The doctor did release her back to work without restrictions on that date.

Claimant went back to her original position in early August, 2017. On or about September 6, 2017 she received a warning about her work performance. Claimant did not put all the required tacks on some products she was working on at her work station on that date. Claimant was told that further discipline could result in termination from the employment. Claimant did have some confusion about how many tacks were required for different products she was asked to work on by employer during that process.

On October 9, 2017 claimant was working on the line. Claimant received instructions on how many units needed tacks from a monitor screen in her work area. The monitor indicated a group of products that came to her station did not need any tacks. Claimant followed the directions on the monitor and sent the products through. Employer noticed that the products had left claimant's area without having items tacked down as instructed. Employer asked claimant, and she explained that the monitor screen said zero tacks. Employer explained to claimant that the monitor screen was not the final word on the required tacks. There was also paperwork in a container that she was supposed to check before each job. Claimant failed to check the paperwork, and followed the instructions on the screen.

Employer conducted an investigation into the incident and reviewed claimant's employee file. Under employer's rules three corrective action letters in a twelve month rolling period constitute grounds for termination. Employer consulted with the corporate office and counsel. Because claimant had two prior corrective action letters employer decided to terminate claimant's employment on October 18, 2017.

## **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. *Discharge for misconduct.* If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

### **Discharge for misconduct.**

(1) *Definition.*

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties

and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

**(4) Report required.** The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

**(8) Past acts of misconduct.** While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(5) provides:

**Discharge for misconduct.**

**(5) Trial period.** A dismissal, because of being physically unable to do the work, being not capable of doing the work assigned, not meeting the employer's standards, or having been hired on a trial period of employment and not being able to do the work shall not be issues of misconduct.

The gravity of the incident, number of policy violations and prior warnings are factors considered when analyzing misconduct. The lack of a current warning may detract from a finding of an intentional policy violation. The Iowa Supreme Court has opined that one unexcused absence is not misconduct even when it followed nine other excused absences and was in violation of a direct order. *Sallis v. EAB*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). *Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984), held that the absences must be both excessive and unexcused. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the term "excessive" is more than one. Three incidents of tardiness or absenteeism after a warning has been held to be misconduct. *Clark v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). While three is a reasonable interpretation of "excessive" based on current case law and Webster's Dictionary, the interpretation is best derived from the facts presented.

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based upon such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based upon a current act. A lapse of 11 days from the final act until discharge when claimant was notified on the fourth day that his conduct was grounds for dismissal did not make the final act a "past act." Where an employer gives seven days' notice to the employee that it will consider discharging him, the date of that notice is used to measure whether the act complained of is current. *Greene v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). An unpublished decision held informally that two calendar weeks or

up to ten work days from the final incident to the discharge may be considered a current act. *Milligan v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, No. 10-2098 (Iowa Ct. App. filed June 15, 2011).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Generally, continued refusal to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. *Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Co.*, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); however, "Balky and argumentative" conduct is not necessarily disqualifying. *City of Des Moines v. Picray*, (No. \_\_\_ - \_\_\_, Iowa Ct. App. filed \_\_\_, 1986).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

Failure in job performance due to inability or incapacity is not considered misconduct because the actions were not volitional. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979). Where an individual is discharged due to a failure in job performance, proof of that individual's ability to do the job is required to justify disqualification, rather than accepting the employer's subjective view. To do so is to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the claimant. *Kelly v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 386 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).

Employer did not provide sufficient evidence of deliberate conduct in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Claimant's conduct does not evince a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in a deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees. Benefits are allowed.

**DECISION:**

The decision of the representative dated November 2, 2017 (reference 01) is reversed. Claimant is eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits, provided claimant meets all other eligibility requirements. The benefits withheld based upon this separation shall be paid to claimant.

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Duane L. Golden  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

dlg/scn