IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

ANGELA M GUDENKAUF

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 14A-UI-12388-B2T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

KELLY SERVICES INC

Employer

OC: 10/12/14

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 – Voluntary Quit Iowa Code § 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Claimant filed an appeal from the November 3, 2014, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on December 22, 2014. The claimant did participate. The employer did not participate although they had registered with the C2T network.

ISSUES:

Whether the appeal is timely.

Whether claimant guit for good cause attributable to employer.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on November 3, 2014. Claimant did receive the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by November 13, 2014. The appeal was not filed until December 2, 2014, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

Claimant contacted the Administrative Law Judge at 1:33 p.m. Hearing in this matter was scheduled for 1:00 p.m. The Administrative Law Judge had previously been in touch with employer and notified employer if they were not called by 1:30 p.m. that they would not be contacted today. As the only issue that the court heard information surrounding was that of timeliness, the Administrative Law Judge did not contact employer after 1:30 p.m.

Claimant received the documents from IWD in this matter on or around November 6, 2014. Claimant did not file the appeal as she mistakenly viewed this matter as resolved when she contacted IWD and sent information regarding her being able and available for work. Later she filed an appeal in this matter.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of § 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to § 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving § 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary guit pursuant to § 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving § 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding § 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begin running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-26.2(96)(1) and Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (lowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (lowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (lowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (lowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (lowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the lowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6-2, and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

As the appeal is this matter was not timely filed, the court is not free to address the other issues before it.

DECISION:

The November 3, 2014, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

Blair A. Bennett
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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