

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**PETRA MINJAREZ**

Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-03387-HT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**ADVANCE SERVICES**

Employer

**OC: 01/06/13**

**Claimant: Appellant (4)**

Section 96.5(1)j – Quit/Temporary  
Section 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The claimant, Petra Minjarez, filed an appeal from a decision dated March 4, 2013, reference 01. The decision disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits. After due notice was issued a hearing was held by telephone conference call on April 23, 2013. The claimant participated on her own behalf and Gisella Young acted as interpreter. The employer, Advance Services, participated by Risk Management Specialist Michael Payne. Exhibit D-1 was admitted into the record.

**ISSUE:**

The issue is whether the appeal is timely.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on March 4, 2013. The claimant received the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by March 14, 2013. The appeal was not filed until March 21, 2013, which is after the date noticed on the decision.

The records of Iowa Workforce Development indicate the claimant has earned at least ten times her weekly benefit amount from subsequent employers after the date of separation from this employment.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code Section 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the

claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

The claimant is disqualified as a result of her separation from this employer. However, she has requalified by earning ten times her weekly benefit amount subsequent to this separation.

**DECISION:**

The decision of the representative dated March 4, 2013, reference 01, is modified in favor of the appellant. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect. The account of Advance Services will not be charged with benefits paid to the claimant after October 1, 2012. The claimant has requalified for unemployment benefits after her separation by earning ten times her weekly benefit amount prior to filing her current claim for benefits.

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Bonny G. Hendricksmeier  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

bgh/pjs