

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**TAMIE K HON**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 07A-UI-06559-LT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**ADECCO USA INC**  
Employer

**OC: 06/03/07 R: 02**  
**Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct  
871 IAC 24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer filed a timely appeal from the June 20, 2007, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on July 19, 2007. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Katherine Olson and was represented by Tom Lindquist of Frick UC Express.

**ISSUE:**

The issue is whether claimant was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time return mail processor at MetLife from October 16, 2006 until June 6, 2007, when she was discharged from the MetLife assignment. Claimant was last absent on June 6 and reported her absence related to illness. She had been diagnosed with cancer, notified employer of this before her hire, and indicated she would need time off for treatment, including but not limited to surgery and recovery in December.

Claimant was also absent because of incarceration for domestic assault on December 10, 11, and 12, 2006, notified employer of those charges and provided documentation from all court appearances and determinations through her sentencing of probation, most recently on May 15, 2007. Employer had issued no warnings that her job was in jeopardy for any reason.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

871 IAC 24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

871 IAC 24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness or injury cannot constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). Absences related to lack of childcare are generally held to be unexcused. *Harlan v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 350 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1984). However, a good faith inability to obtain childcare for a sick infant may be excused. *McCourtney v. Imprimis Technology, Inc.*, 465 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. App. 1991).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job-related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. In the case of an illness, it would seem reasonable that employer

would not want an employee to report to work if they are at risk of infecting other employees or customers. Certainly, an employee who is ill or injured is not able to perform their job at peak levels. A reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of the Iowa Employment Security Act. An employer's point system or no-fault absenteeism policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits. Because the final absence for which she was discharged from the assignment was related to properly reported illness, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism has been established and no disqualification is imposed.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Employment Appeal Board*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

As to the separation from Adecco itself, an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job-related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as claimant had notified employer about the probation on May 15, 2007, some three weeks prior to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish a current or final act of misconduct. The evidence strongly suggests pretextual reasons for the separation because of her illness. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

#### **DECISION:**

The June 20, 2007, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no current disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

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Dévon M. Lewis  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/kjw