IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

MOHOMMED N MERI

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 14A-UI-12141-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

TPI IOWA LLC

Employer

OC: 11/02/14

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Mohammed Meri filed a timely appeal from the November 20, 2014, reference 01, decision that disqualified him for benefits and that relieved the employer of liability for benefits; based on an Agency conclusion that he had been discharged for excessively unexcused absenteeism. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on December 12, 2014. Mr. Meri participated. The employer did not respond to the hearing notice instructions to provide a telephone number for the hearing and did not participate. Exhibit A was received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether Mr. Meri was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies him for unemployment insurance benefits or that relieves the employer of liability for benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Mohammed Meri was employed by TPI lowa, L.L.C. as a full-time crane operator from June 2014 until November 3, 2014 when the employer notified him that he was discharged for exceeding the allowable number of attendance points. Mr. Meri's work hours were 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., Monday evening through Saturday morning. Mr. Meri most recently performed work for the employer during the overnight shift that started on the evening of October 30 and that ended on the morning of October 31, 2014. Mr. Meri was off work the next day for vacation and was next scheduled to work on the evening of November 3, 2014. Mr. Meri had requested the vacation in advance pursuant to the employer's vacation request protocol and the employer had approved the request. Prior to the vacation day on October 31-November 1, 2014 Mr. Meri's most recent absence had been approximately two weeks earlier, when he was absent due to illness and had properly reported the absence to the employer.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also <u>Greene v. EAB</u>, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (lowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's unexcused absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Employers may not graft on additional requirements to what is an excused absence under the law. See Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board, 743 N.W.2d 554 (lowa Ct. App. 2007). For example, an employee's failure to provide a doctor's note in connection with an absence that was due to illness properly reported to the employer will not alter the fact that such an illness would be an excused absence under the law. Gaborit, 743 N.W.2d at 557.

The evidence in the record does not establish misconduct in connection with the employment. The employer did not participate in the hearing and did not present any evidence to support the allegation that Mr. Meri was discharged for excessively unexcused absences or any other form of misconduct. The evidence indicates that the two most recent absences were an absence due to illness that was properly reported to the employer and a vacation day that was approved in advance. The evidence fails to establish any absences that would be unexcused absences under the applicable law.

Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that Mr. Meri was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, Mr. Meri is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits.

DECISION:

The November 20, 2014, reference 01, decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

James E. Timberland Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	

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