

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

TOMI G RODGERS
Claimant

ANNETT HOLDINGS INC
Employer

APPEAL 20A-UI-12096-JC-T
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 03/15/20
Claimant: Respondent (1R)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview
PL116-136, Sec. 2104 – Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer/appellant, Annett Holdings Inc., filed an appeal from the September 23, 2020 (reference 03) Iowa Workforce Development (“IWD”) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on November 24, 2020. The hearing was held jointly with Appeal 20A-UI-12095-JC-T. The claimant, Tomi Rodgers, participated personally. The employer participated through Tim Heim.

The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records. Employer Exhibit 1 was admitted. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?
Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?
Can any charges to the employer’s account be waived?
Is the claimant eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a night fleet manager beginning January 6, 2020 and was separated from employment on March 16, 2020, when she was discharged.

Claimant had no prior warnings and was in her first 90 days of employment for employer. She had been trained on employer policies and signed an acknowledgement of the handbook. See Employer Exhibit 1. Claimant last performed work on March 11, 2020. On the same day, she

had a conversation with employer that her doctor was advising she not return to work for two months due to a health condition which made her high risk if exposed to COVID-19. Employer did not place claimant on a leave of absence and did not have remote work available. Employer initiated separation with claimant.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has received unemployment benefits in the amount of \$1,924.00, since filing a claim with an effective date of March 15, 2020.

The claimant also received federal unemployment insurance benefits through Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC). Claimant received \$2,400.00 in FPUC benefits through May 2, 2020.

The administrative record also establishes that the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview or make a witness with direct knowledge available for rebuttal. Julie Underwood participated.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa law disqualifies individuals who are discharged from employment for misconduct from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a. They remain disqualified until such time as they requalify for benefits by working and earning insured wages ten times their weekly benefit amount. *Id.*

Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.32(1)a provides:

“Misconduct” is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

In an at-will employment environment, an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be “substantial.” *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

Failure in job performance due to inability or incapacity is not considered misconduct because the actions were not volitional. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979). Where an individual is discharged due to a failure in job performance, proof of that individual’s ability to do the job is required to justify disqualification, rather than accepting the employer’s subjective view. To do so is to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the claimant. *Kelly v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 386 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).

In this case, the claimant was discharged after reporting to her employer that her doctor advised she not perform work for two months. Because claimant was in her probationary period, employer moved to separate her from employment, rather than place her on a leave of absence or otherwise preserve employment. There is no evidence presented that the claimant’s actions violated any rule or procedure of the employer. The question before the administrative law judge in this case is not whether the employer has the right to discharge this employee, but whether the claimant’s discharge is disqualifying under the provisions of the Iowa Employment Security Law. While the decision to terminate the claimant may have been a sound decision from a management viewpoint, for the above stated reasons, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not sustained its burden of proof in establishing that the claimant’s discharge was due to a final or current act of job related misconduct. Accordingly, benefits are allowed provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

The issue of whether the claimant was able to and available for work due to medical restrictions effective March 15, 2020 is remanded to the Benefits Bureau for an initial investigation and decision.

Because the claimant is eligible for benefits, the issues of overpayment of regular unemployment insurance benefits and relief of charges are moot.

The final issue to address is whether the claimant is eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC).

PL116-136, Sec. 2104 provides, in pertinent part:

(b) Provisions of Agreement

(1) Federal pandemic unemployment compensation.--Any agreement under this section shall provide that the State agency of the State will make payments of

regular compensation to individuals in amounts and to the extent that they would be determined if the State law of the State were applied, with respect to any week for which the individual is (disregarding this section) otherwise entitled under the State law to receive regular compensation, as if such State law had been modified in a manner such that the amount of regular compensation (including dependents' allowances) payable for any week shall be equal to

(A) the amount determined under the State law (before the application of this paragraph), plus

(B) an additional amount of \$600 (in this section referred to as "Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation").

....

(f) Fraud and Overpayments

(2) Repayment.--In the case of individuals who have received amounts of Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation to which they were not entitled, the State shall require such individuals to repay the amounts of such Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation to the State agency...

Because the claimant is allowed regular unemployment insurance benefits, she is also eligible for FPUC, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer is not charged for these federal benefits.

DECISION:

The September 23, 2020, (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible. She is not overpaid benefits. The employer's account cannot be relieved of charges associated with the claim for regular unemployment insurance benefits. The claimant is also eligible for FPUC, provided she is otherwise eligible.

REMAND:

The issue of whether the claimant was able to and available for work due to medical restrictions effective March 15, 2020 is remanded to the Benefits Bureau for an initial investigation and decision.



Jennifer L. Beckman
Administrative Law Judge
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau
Iowa Workforce Development
1000 East Grand Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209
Fax 515-478-3528

December 7, 2020
Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/mh