BEFORE THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD Lucas State Office Building Fourth floor Des Moines, Iowa 50319

:

PAMELA SEVANS

HEARING NUMBER: 09B-UI-06016

Claimant,

.

and

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD DECISION

CASEY'S MARKETING COMPANY :

Employer.

NOTICE

THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL unless (1) a request for a REHEARING is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within 20 days of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT IS FILED WITHIN 30 days of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within 30 days of the date of the denial.

SECTION: 871 IAC 26.8(5)

DECISION

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE ALLOWED IF OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE

The claimant appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. A majority of the Appeal Board, one member dissenting, finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The Employment Appeal Board REVERSES as set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant, Pamela Evans, worked for Casey's Marketing Co. from October 6, 2007 through February 19, 2009 as a full-time assistant manager. The employer has a policy that prohibits the selling of cigarettes to a minor. That policy requires employees to request proper identification to determine if a customer is age appropriate. The claimant signed in acknowledgement of this policy along with many other documents she received at the start of her hire.

On February 20th, the police held a sting operation at the Casey's Store. A customer came into the store for whom the claimant requested ID. The ID appeared legitimate and the claimant sold cigarettes to the customer. Later, the claimant was ticketed for selling cigarettes to a minor. A review of the store video surveillance tape did not reveal whether she correctly 'ID'd' the customer in question. The

employer terminated Ms. Evans for violating store policy. warning with regard to violating this policy.	The claimant had never received any prior

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2009) provides:

Discharge for Misconduct. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The Iowa Supreme court has accepted this definition as reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Lee v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665, (Iowa 2000) (quoting <u>Reigelsberger v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

Although the record establishes that the employer has a policy for which the claimant had knowledge. According to the claimant's Fact-finding statements, she correctly adhered to the policy by checking the customer's ID prior to selling the customer cigarettes. While the employer refutes her statements

indicating that she violated the policy by failing to check his ID, the employer failed to provide any corroborating evidence (video surveillance, statement from the officer, etc.) to support their allegation. If

the claimant did fail to check this customer's ID, or did not catch that the ID was illegal, then at worst, it was an isolated instance of poor judgment. While the employer may have compelling business reasons to terminate the claimant, conduct that might warrant a discharge from employment will not necessarily sustain a disqualification from job insurance benefits. Budding v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 337 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa App. 1983). In light of the fact that Ms. Evans had no prior infractions against her, we conclude that the employer failed to satisfy their burden of proof.

DECISION:	
The administrative law judge's decision dated May 15, 2009 is REVERSED . The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, she is allowed benefits provided she is otherwise eligible.	
	John A. Peno
	Elizabeth L. Seiser
AMG/fnv	
DISSENTING OPINION OF MONIQUE F. KUEST	ER:
I respectfully dissent from the majority decision of the Employment Appeal Board; I would affirm the decision of the administrative law judge in its entirety.	
AMG/fnv	Monique F. Kuester