

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section  
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319  
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI**

**BENJAMIN L MAROLF  
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215 E 5<sup>TH</sup> ST APT #1  
WILTON IA 52778**

**CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL  
11430 HAMILTON AVE  
CINCINNATI OH 45231**

**Appeal Number: 04A-UI-08257-DT  
OC: 01/25/04 R: 04  
Claimant: Respondent (1)**

**This Decision Shall Become Final**, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319**.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

**STATE CLEARLY**

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

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(Administrative Law Judge)

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(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-3-a – Work Refusal  
Section 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Construction Personnel (employer) appealed a representative's July 12, 2004 decision (reference 01) that concluded Benjamin L. Marolf (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on August 25, 2004. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with two related appeals, 04A-UI-08258-DT and 04A-UI-08259-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. Sarah Covert appeared on the employer's behalf. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 and Employer's Exhibit One was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES: Was the employer's appeal timely? Did the claimant refuse an offer of suitable work without good cause?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The representative's decision was mailed to the employer's last known address of record on July 12, 2004. The employer did not receive the decision until August 2, because it had been misdelivered by the United States Postal Service to another office in the same building. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by July 22, 2002. The appeal was not filed until August 2, 2004, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

The employer is a temporary employment firm for construction work. The claimant began taking assignments with the employer in August 2003. His last day on an assignment was May 29, 2004. On June 8, June 10, June 14, June 22 and July 28, the employer called various phone numbers it had for the claimant attempting to offer him work in various locations in Illinois, Minnesota, and Missouri. The employer asserted that it left messages on answering systems at those numbers. The claimant did not receive those messages, nor did he receive a letter sent by the employer on August 3 via regular mail. While the claimant had not received the messages, he would not have accepted the offers as he had accepted an assignment with another temporary employment firm on June 8 for which he immediately began education and prequalification for his June 16 start date. He did not check in weekly with the employer after June 8 as he was not happy with the assignment on which the employer had sent him on May 29, and he did not feel a need to do so when he had accepted the assignment with the other firm. He did not receive any benefits for weeks after the week ending June 12 due to his being fully employed.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the employer timely appealed the representative's decision.

Iowa Code Section 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was due to error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code Section 96.6-2. Therefore, the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979); Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979), and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

The substantive issue in this case is whether the claimant refused a suitable offer of work.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-3-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

3. Failure to accept work. If the department finds that an individual has failed, without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work when directed by the department or to accept suitable work when offered that individual. The department shall, if possible, furnish the individual with the names of employers which are seeking employees. The individual shall apply to and obtain the signatures of the employers designated by the department on forms provided by the department. However, the employers may refuse to sign the forms. The individual's failure to obtain the signatures of designated employers, which have not refused to sign the forms, shall disqualify the individual for benefits until requalified. To requalify for benefits after disqualification under this subsection, the individual shall work in and be paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

a. In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the department shall consider the degree of risk involved to the individual's health, safety, and morals, the individual's physical fitness, prior training, length of unemployment, and prospects for securing local work in the individual's customary occupation, the distance of the available work from the individual's residence, and any other factor which the department finds bears a reasonable relation to the purposes of this paragraph. Work is suitable if the work meets all the other criteria of this paragraph and if the gross weekly wages for the work equal or exceed the following percentages of the individual's average

weekly wage for insured work paid to the individual during that quarter of the individual's base period in which the individual's wages were highest:

- (1) One hundred percent, if the work is offered during the first five weeks of unemployment.
- (2) Seventy-five percent, if the work is offered during the sixth through the twelfth week of unemployment.
- (3) Seventy percent, if the work is offered during the thirteenth through the eighteenth week of unemployment.
- (4) Sixty-five percent, if the work is offered after the eighteenth week of unemployment.

However, the provisions of this paragraph shall not require an individual to accept employment below the federal minimum wage.

871 IAC 24.24(1)a provides:

- (1) Bona fide offer of work.
  - a. In deciding whether or not a claimant failed to accept suitable work, or failed to apply for suitable work, it must first be established that a bona fide offer of work was made to the individual by personal contact or that a referral was offered to the claimant by personal contact to an actual job opening and a definite refusal was made by the individual. For purposes of a recall to work, a registered letter shall be deemed to be sufficient as a personal contact.

871 IAC 24.24(7) provides:

- (7) Gainfully employed outside of area where job is offered. Two reasons which generally would be good cause for not accepting an offer of work would be if the claimant were gainfully employed elsewhere or the claimant did not reside in the area where the job was offered.

While the employer could require the claimant to check in weekly for work in order to retain his employment status with the employer, his failure to do so does not render him "unable and available for work" for purposes of eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. In this case, there was no bona fide offer of work and no definite refusal of work. Further, the claimant had a good reason for not accepting the offers as he was otherwise gainfully employed. Benefits are allowed, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.

#### DECISION:

The representative's July 12, 2004 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The appeal in this case was timely. The claimant did not refuse a suitable offer of work. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

ld/pjs