

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

MATTHEW L ROSS

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 18A-UI-12277-JC

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

FESSLER CARBONIC GAS CO

Employer

OC: 11/18/18

Claimant: Respondent (2)

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the December 11, 2018, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. An in-person hearing was conducted in Des Moines on January 11, 2019. The claimant did not respond to the notice of hearing and did not participate in the hearing. The employer participated through Robert Fessler, owner. Jan Fessler also testified. Employer Exhibits 1-2 were admitted into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records including the fact-finding documents. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Is the appeal timely?

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a driver and was separated from employment on November 23, 2018, when he was discharged.

The employer does not have written rules but explained to the claimant at hire in March 2018 its expectations of drivers. Generally, drivers are permitted to choose the times during the week to complete their route unless otherwise directed by Mr. Fessler. Prior to discharge, the claimant had been verbally warned for failure to complete his routes, being unresponsive to employer calls and text messages, and for missing routes for a week when he failed to notify the employer he would not be in due to his sick child. The claimant acknowledged receiving the last warning in October 2018 (See fact-finding interview).

On November 21, 2018, Mr. Fessler told the claimant verbally that he needed to come in on November 23, 2018 at 7:00 a.m. to complete his routes. He discussed the claimant starting at Merle Hay mall and then doing his other stops. The reason Mr. Fessler asked the claimant to begin early was for safety issues associated with "Black Friday" shoppers as his trucks were large and often had to block driveways. He wanted that portion of the route completed early before crowds increased around the mall.

On November 23, 2018, the claimant neither showed up at 7:00 a.m. nor called to notify the employer he was not going to be at work. Mr. Fessler made attempts to contact the claimant on his phone via call and text message before going to a 10:00 a.m. funeral for an ex-employee. The claimant was unresponsive. Around 11:30 a.m. after the funeral, the claimant called Mr. Fessler, who informed the claimant he was done, for his failure to complete his route that day as directed. The claimant stated he had not been to work because he had been shopping with his wife. The claimant did not attend the hearing or submit evidence in lieu of participation for the Appeals Bureau hearing.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has received unemployment benefits in the amount of \$841.00, since filing a claim with an effective date of November 18, 2018. The claimant discontinued making weekly continued claims after December 4, 2018, which coincides with the beginning of new employment (See fact-finding documents). The administrative record also establishes that the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview or make a witness with direct knowledge available for rebuttal. Jan Fessler attended.

An initial unemployment insurance decision (Reference 01) resulting in the claimant receiving benefits was mailed to the employer's last known address of record on December 11, 2018. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Bureau by December 21, 2018. The employer presented the envelope containing the initial decision, which was not postmarked until December 20, 2018 (Employer Exhibit 2). Consequently, the employer received the decision on December 22, 2018 after the appeal period. The appeal was not filed until December 24, 2018, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision (Employer Exhibit 2). Because the employer mailed the appeal to the incorrect address, the appeal was further delayed.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow the administrative law judge concludes the employer appeal is timely.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides, in pertinent part:

Filing – determination – appeal.

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(2) provides:

Date of submission and extension of time for payments and notices.

(2) The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the

division that the delay in submission was due to division error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service.

a. For submission that is not within the statutory or regulatory period to be considered timely, the interested party must submit a written explanation setting forth the circumstances of the delay.

b. The division shall designate personnel who are to decide whether an extension of time shall be granted.

c. No submission shall be considered timely if the delay in filing was unreasonable, as determined by the department after considering the circumstances in the case.

d. If submission is not considered timely, although the interested party contends that the delay was due to division error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States postal service, the division shall issue an appealable decision to the interested party.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

Pursuant to rules Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). The postage meter mark on the last day for filing does not perfect a timely appeal if the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is beyond the filing date. *Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Cedar Rapids v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).

The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received in a timely fashion. Without timely notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). For unknown reasons, the initial decision dated December 11, 2018 was not actually mailed to the employer until December 20, 2018. The employer filed the appeal within 2 days of receipt. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

The next issue is whether the claimant was discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct.

Iowa law disqualifies individuals who are discharged from employment for misconduct from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a. They remain disqualified until such time as they requalify for benefits by working and earning insured wages ten times their weekly benefit amount. *Id.*

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job related misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The focus of the administrative code definition of misconduct is on deliberate, intentional or culpable acts by the employee. *Id.*

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.* Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law.

Generally, continued refusal to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. *Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Co.*, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). The question of whether the refusal to perform a specific task constitutes misconduct must be determined by evaluating both the reasonableness of the employer's request in light of all circumstances and the employee's

reason for noncompliance. *Endicott v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 367 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).

In this case, the claimant was a driver for the employer, responsible for making deliveries of employer product. While the employer did allow some flexibility with scheduling the routes, the claimant was specifically directed on November 21, 2018 to begin his November 23, 2018 shift, which coincided with "Black Friday." Because the claimant's route would intersect with mall traffic, Mr. Fessler wanted the claimant to complete that portion of his route early. The administrative law judge concludes the employer's request under the circumstances was reasonable. The claimant had previously been verbally counseled for not completing his shifts and being unresponsive to employer contacts, most recently in October 2018. His conduct on November 23, 2018, was repetitive of prior conduct for which he had been verbally counseled. In addition, the claimant's explanation of being busy shopping with his wife does not mitigate his non-compliance of the employer's reasonable request. The claimant did not attend the hearing to refute the employer's credible testimony. The administrative law judge is persuaded the claimant knew or should have known his conduct was contrary to the best interests of the employer. Therefore, based on the evidence presented, the claimant was discharged for misconduct. Benefits are denied.

The final issues to address are whether the claimant must repay benefits and whether the employer can be relieved of potential charges.

Iowa Code § 96.3(7)a-b provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.

a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

b. (1) (a) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding § 96.8, subsection 5. The employer shall not be relieved of charges if benefits are paid because the employer or an agent of the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. This prohibition against relief of charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers.

(b) However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to § 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment.

(2) An accounting firm, agent, unemployment insurance accounting firm, or other entity that represents an employer in unemployment claim matters and demonstrates a continuous pattern of failing to participate in the initial determinations to award benefits, as determined and defined by rule by the department, shall be denied permission by the department to represent any employers in unemployment insurance matters. This

subparagraph does not apply to attorneys or counselors admitted to practice in the courts of this states pursuant to § 602.10101.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

(1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if unrebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.

(2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.

(3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19.

(4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual," as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code section 96.3(7)“b” as amended by 2008 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

Because the claimant's separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which he was not entitled. The claimant has been overpaid benefits in the amount of \$814.00. The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The employer will not be charged for benefits if it is determined that it did participate in the fact-finding interview. Iowa Code § 96.3(7), Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10. In this case, the claimant has received benefits but was not eligible for those benefits. The employer satisfactorily participated in the scheduled fact-finding interview by way of Ann Fessler. Since the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview, the claimant is obligated to repay the benefits he received and the employer's account shall not be charged.

DECISION:

The December 11, 2018, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The appeal was timely. The claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct. Benefits are withheld until such time as he has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount, provided he is otherwise eligible. The claimant has been overpaid benefits in the amount of \$814.00 and must repay the benefits. The employer's account is relieved of charges.

Jennifer L. Beckman
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn