

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

KATHRYN E NAIL
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-06283-LT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

SWIFT PORK CO
Employer

OC: 04/28/13
Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the May 14, 2013 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on July 1, 2013. Claimant participated. Employer participated through human resources supervisor Luis Meza.

ISSUE:

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to employer or did employer discharge claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a production worker and was separated from employment on April 18, 2013. Her last day of work was April 12, 2013 when she left early due to illness and was assigned one-half attendance point. The claimant was a no-call/no-show on April 15, 16, and 17, 2013. She was scheduled to work on Saturday, April 13 and went to office in the morning to report her continued illness. The woman in human resources told her to return on second shift and ask her immediate supervisor Mario Almenza. If he approved the absence she said she would excuse it. She reported to Almenza who told her if she did not work that day she would “be done.” She asked department superintendent Jeremy Ruopp who said the decision was up to Almenza. Because she was ill, she was not able to report to work on April 13 and received her final attendance point to total 9.5 points. Termination from employment occurs at 9 points. Her most recent written warning was issued on March 13, 2013, for eight attendance points. She believed Almenza had the authority to fire her. Ruopp hired her.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant did not quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

871 IAC 24.26(21) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(21) The claimant was compelled to resign when given the choice of resigning or being discharged. This shall not be considered a voluntary leaving.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the Iowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

Because there was unclear communication between claimant and employer about the interpretation of both parties' statements about the status of the employment relationship; the issue must be resolved by an examination of witness credibility and burden of proof. Since most members of management are considerably more experienced in personnel issues and operate from a position of authority over a subordinate employee, it is reasonably implied that the ability to communicate clearly is extended to discussions about employment status. Although Almenza no authority to discharge claimant, she did not know that and Roupp, who hired her, deferred the absence decision to Almenza, thus perpetuating the belief her job was in jeopardy due to attendance. Her reporting her illness twice on April 12 and again on April 13 evinces an intention to continue working. She did not report on April 15, 16 or 17 because she reasonably believed she had been discharged because of attendance points. Thus, the separation was a discharge and not a voluntary leaving of employment.

The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser*, and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand witnesses, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's testimony is credible as to her recollection of events and conversations.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term “absenteeism” also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as “tardiness.” An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984).

An employer’s point system or no-fault absenteeism policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits. A reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of the Iowa Employment Security Act. Because her absences were related to properly reported illness, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The May 14, 2013 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. Claimant did not quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs