

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

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**MICHAEL M PATZNER**  
Claimant

**DUBUQUE STAMPING & MFG INC**  
Employer

**APPEAL 15A-UI-02427-JCT**  
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE**  
**DECISION**

**OC: 02/01/15**  
**Claimant: Appellant (2)**

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Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The claimant filed an appeal from the February 18, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon separation. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on April 1, 2015. The claimant participated. The employer participated through Matthew Spawn and Amy Wiedenbacher was an observer.

**ISSUE:**

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as an industrial maintenance lead technician and was separated from employment on February 5, 2015, when he was discharged for insubordinate and disrespectful behavior towards a manager.

On February 3, 2015, the claimant was ending his shift when he was approached by Clayton Title, a supervisor. The claimant was aware that a co-worker, Jeremy, was on site, specifically to lock the premises, which included gates at the entrance, walk in area, back gate and parking lot. Mr. Title told the claimant he was leaving and asked the claimant to lock up. The claimant responded that Jeremy was taking care of it, and the discussion ended. The claimant was discharged two days later for his conduct that evening which was deemed to have been insubordinate for refusing to follow an order from management, and for disrespectful behavior. Prior to separation, the claimant had been issued at least two warnings on April 2, 2014 and June 2014 for his conduct.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and the employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs.*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

The only other person with firsthand knowledge of the final incident leading to separation was Clayton Title. The employer opted not to present him as a witness, in light of the fact the case turned on the claimant's interaction with him about the gate being locked. The administrative law judge is not persuaded that the claimant was given an order and refused to comply versus being asked and the claimant responding that it would be taken care of by Jeremy, who was on site to lock up the premises. Given the serious nature of the proceeding and the employer's allegations resulting in claimant's discharge from employment, the employer's nearly complete reliance on hearsay statements is unsettling. Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser, id.*, and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer. The claimant denied being insubordinate or disrespectful in replying to Clayton Title that Jeremy was locking up the premises and would handle the parking lot gate. The employer has not met its burden of proof to establish a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined.

Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as a condemnation of the employer's right to terminate the claimant for violating its policies and procedures. The employer had a right to follow its policies and procedures. The analysis of unemployment insurance eligibility, however, does not end there. This ruling simply holds that the employer did not meet its burden of proof to establish the claimant's conduct leading separation was misconduct under Iowa law. Since the employer has not met its burden of proof, benefits are allowed.

**DECISION:**

The February 18, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. The benefits claimed and withheld shall be paid, provided he is otherwise eligible.

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Jennifer L. Coe  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jlc/pjs