IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

TYRONE D JONES APT 3 120 ½ N FRANKLIN MANCHESTER IA 52057-1552

BEATON INC BURGER KING #100 4250 GLASS RD NE CEDAR RAPIDS IA 52402

Appeal Number:06A-UI-04978-LTOC:04-09-06R:OLaimant:Appellant (2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.*

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- 1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a - Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Claimant filed a timely appeal from the May 5, 2006, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on May 24, 2006. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Kathy Frerichs and Tom Elledge.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a part-time crewmember and shift supervisor through March 3, 2006 when he was discharged. On March 2 claimant noticed he was on the March 3 schedule to report to work for both the 5 a.m. and 8 a.m. shifts so before he went home at the end of his shift he brought the conflict to the attention of store manager Tom Elledge. By the end of that conversation it was claimant's understanding that Elledge would contact the assistant manager

Melanie and have her contact claimant about his schedule. Elledge did not speak to Melanie or change the schedule himself. Later in the day claimant had not heard from Melanie so he called the store and spoke with a female employee who checked the written schedule and told claimant he was scheduled to work at 8 a.m.

When claimant reported to work at 8 a.m. on March 3 Elledge fired him. Elledge and another employee, Tina, were at the store at 5 a.m. and employer had claimant's cell phone number and knew he lived across the street from the store but did not attempt to contact him to report earlier than 8 a.m. Another store opener, Heath, who was scheduled to work at 5 a.m. but did not report until 7 a.m. was disciplined but not fired as Elledge did not want to be short two store openers at once.

Elledge spoke to claimant approximately two weeks earlier about two instances of tardiness related to oversleeping but did not advise claimant either verbally or in writing his job was in jeopardy for that reason after claimant completed his job duties in time for the store to open for customers.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Employment Appeal Board*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Since employer did not clarify the schedule in writing and did not communicate with Melanie as promised and have her get back to claimant, his reliance on the information he obtained when he called the store later on March 2 indicating his schedule said his shift was to begin at 8 a.m. on March 3 was reasonable. Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant his job was in jeopardy either verbally or in writing about the issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The May 5, 2006, reference 01, decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

dml/pjs