IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

DAVID L ALEXANDER

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 09A-UI-02321-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DECISION

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC

Employer

OC: 01/04/09

Claimant: Respondent (2/R)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.3-7 – Recovery of Overpayment of Benefits

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's February 2, 2009 decision (reference 01) that concluded David L. Alexander (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on March 9, 2009. The claimant participated in the hearing. Kris Travis appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on April 15, 2008. He worked full time as a production worker in the employer's Columbus Junction, Iowa pork processing facility. His last day of work was December 27, 2008. The employer discharged him on January 6, 2009. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive absenteeism.

The employer has a 14-point attendance policy. The claimant had been given warnings for attendance on October 17, 2008 (three points) and December 10, 2008 (eight points), and December 26, 2008 (ten points). It is not clear that the claimant received the December 26 warning in writing, but his supervisor had at least verbally advised him at that time that he was approaching the termination level for attendance.

On December 29 the claimant's girlfriend left him; as she had cared for his children, aged six and seven, he then did not have child care for his children. He called in an absence for that day, which he reported was due to illness but in fact was due to lack of child care. This resulted in assessment of one point by the employer, bringing him to 11 points. He was likewise absent on December 30 and December 31, which he called in as due to illness but in fact was again

due to lack of child care. He was assessed a point for each day, bringing him to 13 points. On January 2 the testimony is disputed as to whether or not the claimant called in, but he was again absent due to lack of child care. At the least he would have been assessed one point; as the employer had no record of him calling in, it was assessing him three points. Even if only one point was counted the claimant was already at least at 14 points, the discharge level, as of January 2. The claimant continued to miss work after January 2 due to lack of child care. When he subsequently came in to discuss his situation with the employer, he was informed that he had exceeded his allowable points.

The claimant established a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective January 4, 2009. The claimant has received unemployment insurance benefits after the separation from employment.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a.

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon v. lowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984).

Absenteeism can constitute misconduct; however, to be misconduct, absences must be both excessive and unexcused. 871 IAC 24.32(7). Absences due to issues that are of purely personal responsibility, specifically including child care responsibilities, are not excusable. Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984); Harlan v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 350 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1984). The claimant's final absences were not excused and were not due to actual illness or other reasonable grounds. The claimant had previously been warned that future absences could result in termination. Higgins, supra. The employer discharged the claimant for reasons amounting to work-connected misconduct.

The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not

received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The employer will not be charged for benefits whether or not the overpayment is recovered. Iowa Code § 96.3-7. In this case, the claimant has received benefits but was ineligible for those benefits. The matter of determining the amount of the overpayment and whether the overpayment should be recovered under Iowa Code § 96.3-7-b is remanded the Claims Section.

DECISION:

The representative's February 2, 2009 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The employer discharged the claimant for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits as of January 4, 2009. This disqualification continues until he has been paid ten times his weekly benefit amount for insured work, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account will not be charged. The matter is remanded to the Claims Section for investigation and determination of the overpayment issue.

Lucation A. F. Donner

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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