### IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

VICKI L BASS Claimant

# APPEAL NO. 07A-UI-05053-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL INC Employer

> OC: 04/01/07 R: 01 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-1-j – Temporary Employment 871 IAC 24.26(19) – Temporary Employment Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Vicki L. Bass (claimant) appealed a representative's May 10, 2007 decision (reference 01) that concluded she qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Manpower International, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on June 6, 2007. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 07A-UI-05054-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer's representative received the hearing notice and responded by calling the Appeals Section on June 5, 2007. The representative indicated that Tina Ricks would be available at the scheduled time for the hearing at a specified telephone number. However, when the administrative law judge called that number at the scheduled time for the hearing, Ms. Ricks was not available; therefore, the employer did not participate in the hearing. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

## ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct?

## FINDINGS OF FACT:

The employer is a temporary employment firm with an exclusive arrangement with a brewing company in Golden, Colorado, for temp-to-hire employment. The claimant wished to pursue employment with the business client and so began an assignment through the employer with the business client on June 18, 2006. Upon the commencement of the assignment she was informed that if she was not hired by the business client by the end of working 1,480 hours, the assignment would be considered completed. She was also advised that after the expiration of the assignment she could not seek a new assignment with the business client until at least 90 days had passed, after which she could reapply for an assignment.

The claimant was not hired as a regular employee by the business client. On March 7 she was informed that March 16 would be her last day on the assignment, as she would reach 1,480 as of that date.

### REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The essential question in this case is whether there was a disqualifying separation from employment. In essence, the issue is whether the employer or the business client ended the claimant's assignment and effectively discharged her for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer or client was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. <u>Cosper v. IDJS</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

- 1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
  - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or

b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or

- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
  - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
  - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
    - 1. The employer's interest, or
    - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The claimant was removed from her assignment because she was being "laid off," due to lack of work. The employer has failed to meet its burden to establish misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, but the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

#### 871 IAC 24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a

voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of lowa Code section 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of lowa Code section 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The separation is deemed to be completion of temporary assignment. The fact that the claimant did not elect to reapply to return to the assignment after 90 days does not transform the separation into a voluntary quit. Benefits are allowed, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.

### **DECISION:**

The representative's May 10, 2007 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The employer did effectively discharge the claimant from her assignment, but not for disqualifying reasons; but rather because the temporary assignment had been completed. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/kjw