

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**JANET L BRIGGS**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 12A-UI-11475-JTT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**HY-VEE INC**  
Employer

**OC: 01/08/12**  
**Claimant: Appellant (1)**

Section 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quit  
Section 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Janet Briggs filed an appeal from the March 2, 2012, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on October 18, 2012. Ms. Briggs participated. Sue Coppola of Corporate Cost Control represented the employer and presented testimony through Natalie McGee. The hearing in this matter was consolidated with the hearing in Appeal Number 12A-UI-11476-JTT. Department Exhibits D-1, D-2, and D-3 were received into evidence.

**ISSUE:**

Whether Ms. Briggs' appeal from the March 2, 2012, reference 01, disqualification decision was timely. It was not.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: On March 2, 2011, Iowa Workforce Development mailed a copy of the March 2, 2012, reference 01, decision to Janet Briggs' last known address of record. Ms. Briggs received the decision in a timely manner, prior to the deadline for appeal. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by March 12, 2012. Ms. Briggs did not take any steps to appeal the decision when she received it. On September 17, 2012, Workforce Development mailed a reference 02 decision to Ms. Briggs that said she was overpaid \$1,522.00 in benefits based on the earlier disqualification decision. Ms. Briggs mailed an appeal to the overpayment decision. The envelope bears a September 24, 2012 postmark. When the Appeals Section received the appeal from the overpayment decision, the Appeals Section treated the appeal also as an appeal from the earlier disqualification decision.

## REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten-day deadline for appeal begins to run on the date Workforce Development mails the decision to the parties. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the Agency representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

An appeal submitted by mail is deemed filed on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it was received, or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion. See 871 AC 24.35(1)(a). See also Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). An appeal submitted by any other means is deemed filed on the date it is received by the Unemployment Insurance Division of Iowa Workforce Development. See 871 IAC 24.35(1)(b).

The appeal in question was filed on September 24, 2012, the date of the postmark.

The evidence in the record establishes that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a

representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The record shows that Ms. Briggs did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. Ms. Briggs had received the March 2, 2012, reference 01, disqualification decision in a timely manner, prior to the deadline for appeal, but had elected not to file an appeal at that time. The delay in filing an appeal from the March 2, 2012, reference 01, disqualification decision was attributable to Ms. Briggs. It was not attributable to Workforce Development or the United States Postal Service. See Iowa Admin. Code section 871 IAC 24.35(2). The appeal was not timely. Ms. Briggs is bound by the disqualification decision and, based on the untimely appeal, the administrative law judge does not have jurisdiction to disturb the lower decision. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

**DECISION:**

The Agency representative's March 2, 2012, reference 01, disqualification decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

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James E. Timberland  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/kjw