IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

GREG G LAFEVER Claimant **PETERSON CONTRACTORS INC** Employer	**APPEAL 15A-UI-10819-SC-T** **ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION** **OC: 01/04/15** **Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the September 22, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon the determination he was discharged for excessive unexcused absenteeism after being warned. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on October 12, 2015. Claimant Greg LaFever participated on his own behalf. Employer Peterson Contractors, Inc. participated through payroll employee, Donna Saak.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full time as a truck driver/equipment operator beginning April 13, 2014, and was separated from employment on September 3, 2015, when he was discharged. The claimant had missed work the two days prior due to illness. He left a message for his supervisor John Bohlen to let him know that he would not be at work. On September 3, the claimant was at work, still not feeling well, when he heard Bohlen tell other drivers that if the claimant felt that poorly he should have stayed home. The claimant delivered a truck of gravel to the jobsite and then parked his vehicle and went home. He did not tell Bohlen he was leaving, but Bohlen passed him while the claimant was walking to his personal vehicle and did not say anything. Bohlen sent the claimant a text message telling him to find another job. The claimant also spoke to one of the employer's owners, Mark Peterson, who also told him that his employment was ending.

The claimant had previously missed work on June 22, 23, and 24 of 2015, July 10, 11, and 13 of 2015, and August 12, 2015. He called and left a message for Bohlen when he was going to miss work due to illness.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

> An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
>
> 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
>
> a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

> (7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)…accurately states the law."

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins, supra.*

A properly reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of the Iowa Employment Security Act. Excessive absences are not necessarily unexcused. Absences must be both excessive and unexcused to result in a finding of misconduct. A failure to report to work without notification to the employer is generally considered an unexcused absence.

In this case, the employer contends the claimant failed to properly notify it of his absences. The employer offered the testimony of the payroll person who reviewed the attendance records. Bohlen, the person the claimant was supposed to notify of his absences, was not present to testify as he was working at a jobsite. Bohlen did not record whether the claimant notified him that he was going to miss work; rather, the witness reported Bohlen just remembered that was the claimant's normal process. The claimant contends he properly notified Bohlen of his absences and that his absences were related to illness.

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs.*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

The decision in this case rests, at least in part, upon the credibility of the parties. The employer did not present a witness with direct knowledge of the situation. No request to continue the hearing was made and no written statement of the individual was offered. Given the serious nature of the proceeding and the employer's allegations resulting in claimant's discharge from employment, the employer's nearly complete reliance on hearsay statements is unsettling. Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser*, *id.,* and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer.

The employer has not established that claimant had excessive absences which would be considered unexcused for purposes of unemployment insurance eligibility. Because his last absence was related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct. Since the employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The September 22, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. The benefits withheld based upon this separation shall be paid to claimant.

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Stephanie R. Callahan
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

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