

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**KATHY A HORAN**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 14A-UI-06923-H2T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**HY-VEE INC**  
Employer

**OC: 05/12/13**  
**Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Iowa Code § 96.7(2)a(6) – Appeal from the Statement of Charges  
Iowa Code § 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal  
Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer filed an appeal from the June 12, 2013, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued a hearing was held on July 28, 2014. The claimant did participate and was represented by Mike Lanigan, Attorney at Law. The employer did participate through Stacey Sussman, Human Resources Manager, Bryan Brunson, Convenience store manager and Chad Harto, Store Director; Dane Swenson of Corporate Cost Control and was represented by Larry Lampel also of Corporate Cost Control. Employer's Exhibit One was entered and received into the record.

**ISSUES:**

Did the employer file a timely appeal?

Did the employer file a timely appeal from their statement of charges?

Was the claimant discharged due to job connected misconduct?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a bakery aide beginning on December 12, 1986 through May 7, 2014 when she was discharged. The claimant was discharged for poor work quality. The employer's exhibits illustrate that claimant had a long history of problems with the quality of her work, including prior problems with the cinnamon rolls. However, the records demonstrate that the employer took no final action for many years. The employer's failure to act on the same problems over a period of time that dates back to 2004 could reasonably lead the claimant to believe that her actions were acceptable. There was no warning that under the new store director she was going to be required to face a different standard of conduct.

The employer has not established that they ever filed an appeal as the number they have listed is not the number for the appeals section.

Additionally the employer never filed an appeal to the fourth quarter statement of charges putting them on notice that the claimant was receiving unemployment insurance benefits. While the employer may have filed an appeal to the third quarter, they did not follow up when they received the fourth quarter statement of charges.

### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the employer's appeal is untimely.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute,

and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant.

Iowa Code § 96.7-2-a(6) provides:

2. Contribution rates based on benefit experience.
  - a. (6) Within forty days after the close of each calendar quarter, the department shall notify each employer of the amount of benefits charged to the employer's account during that quarter. The notification shall show the name of each individual to whom benefits were paid, the individual's social security number, and the amount of benefits paid to the individual. An employer which has not been notified as provided in section 96.6, subsection 2, of the allowance of benefits to an individual, may within thirty days after the date of mailing of the notification appeal to the department for a hearing to determine the eligibility of the individual to receive benefits. The appeal shall be referred to an administrative law judge for hearing and the employer and the individual shall receive notice of the time and place of the hearing.

The administrative law judge concludes that the employer did not file its appeal of the Statement of Charges within the time period prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law because it did not file an appeal of that Statement within 30 days of the mailing date. The employer simply did not file an appeal at all to the fourth quarter statement of charges.

Even if the administrative law judge were to determine the employer filed a timely appeal and a timely appeal to the statement of charges, the employer did not establish that the claimant was discharged due to job connected misconduct sufficient to disqualify her from receipt of unemployment insurance benefits.

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Failure in job performance due to inability or incapacity is not considered misconduct because the actions were not volitional. *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979). Where an individual is discharged due to a failure in job performance, proof of that individual's ability to do the job is required to justify disqualification, rather than accepting the employer's subjective view. To do so is to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the claimant. *Kelly v. IDJS*, 386 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa App. 1986). The claimant had a long history of inability to meet the employer's expectations. She was given prior warnings, but no other action was ever taken. Under such circumstances the claimant could reasonably believe she could ignore such warnings. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. The claimant had never had a sustained period of time during which she performed her job duties to employer's satisfaction and inasmuch as she did attempt to perform the job to the best of her ability but was unable to meet the employer's expectations, no intentional misconduct has been established, as is the employer's burden of proof. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). Accordingly, no disqualification pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a is imposed.

**DECISION:**

The June 12, 2013, (reference 01) decision is affirmed. The Statement of Charges are affirmed as the employer did not file a timely appeal. The employer did not file a timely appeal from the representative decision. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

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Teresa K. Hillary  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

tkh/pjs