IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

DANIEL P HEINDL Claimant

APPEAL 17R-UI-11134-JCT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

HYPONEX CORPORATION

Employer

OC: 08/20/17 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the September 6, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits. A first hearing was scheduled but not conducted on October 2, 2017. The claimant's appeal was dismissed for failure to participate. The claimant successfully requested reopening to the Employment Appeal Board who remanded the matter for a new hearing to allow both parties an opportunity to participate.

The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on November 16, 2017. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated through Jolene Adams, office manager. Richard Hunt and Joel Hauschild also participated. Employer Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records including the fact-finding documents. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a heavy equipment operator and was separated from employment on August 4, 2017, when he was discharged.

The claimant was discharged for an incident on August 2, 2017, in which he backed over a stop sign while operating an end loader. The claimant self-reported the accident and acknowledged he had been distracted by a call on his radio (Employer Exhibit 1). The stop sign was mounted and elevated from the floor to alert drivers to slow down in the plant. The claimant was expected to use caution and rear view mirrors when backing up to avoid collisions.

Prior to the claimant's discharge, he had been in an accident on July 17, 2017 in which he had hit a water tank while operating equipment, and caused damage. The claimant was not issued

a written warning for the incident but told to slow down and be careful. The claimant stated he was told it was not a big deal. The employer did not have a written policy concerning accidents or under what circumstances an employee can expect to be discharged if they have a collision with property. The claimant was unaware his job was in jeopardy before August 2, 2017.

The claimant worked for the employer for approximately one year and had no other accidents or safety incidents. The claimant was issued a written warning on July 18, 2017 and on February 17, 2017 for attendance (Employer Exhibit 1).

REASONINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.,* 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all,

part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (lowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.*. In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.* Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law.

In an at-will employment environment, an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

Cognizant of the importance of safety in the workplace, especially in industries where heavy equipment is operated, the administrative law judge is not persuaded the claimant knew or should have known he could be fired on August 2, 2017 if he made contact with the stop sign. While the employer took the opportunity to document a warning to the claimant on July 18, 2017 for attendance, it did not document or formally warn the claimant that his job was in jeopardy for his unsafely operating equipment on July 17, 2017. Nor did the employer present a written policy which would have reasonably placed the claimant on notice that he could be discharged for a second accident.

Based on the evidence presented, the administrative law judge concludes the conduct for which the claimant was discharged was an isolated incident of poor judgment and inasmuch as the employer had not previously warned the claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. Training or general notice to staff about a policy is not considered a disciplinary warning. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. The employer has not met its burden of proof to establish a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined.

The question before the administrative law judge in this case is not whether the employer has the right to discharge this employee, but whether the claimant's discharge is disqualifying under the provisions of the Iowa Employment Security Law. While the decision to terminate the claimant may have been a sound decision from a management viewpoint, for the above stated reasons, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not sustained its burden of proof in establishing that the claimant's discharge was due to job related misconduct. Accordingly, benefits are allowed provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The September 6, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. The benefits claimed and withheld shall be paid, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Jennifer L. Beckman Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn