

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

BRYANT CRAWFORD

Claimant

APPEAL 20A-UI-00806-DB-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

JAM EQUITIES OF SE 14TH LLC

Employer

OC: 11/03/19

Claimant: Respondent (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2) a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer/appellant filed an appeal from the January 24, 2020 (reference 05) unemployment insurance decision that allowed unemployment insurance benefits to the claimant based upon his discharge from employment. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on February 12, 2020. The claimant, Bryant Crawford, did not participate. The employer, Jam Equities of SE 14th LLC, participated through witness Asif Poonja. The administrative law judge took official notice of the claimant's administrative records, including the fact-finding documents.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed part-time as a fry cook at the employer's fast food restaurant. He was employed from September 10, 2019, when this employer acquired the restaurant, until November 18, 2019. Claimant's job duties included cooking food, cleaning, and food inventory. Jaymee Onder was claimant's immediate supervisor. Claimant began working at the employer's SE 14th Street restaurant location and then was transferred to the Merle Hay location.

The employer has a written attendance policy that provides for termination if an employee incurs three attendance issues. Attendance issues include no call no shows and tardiness. Claimant received a copy of the written attendance policy on September 10, 2019.

Claimant was tardy to work on September 14, 2019 and Ms. Onder gave him a verbal warning for his tardiness. Claimant was a no-call/no-show on September 16, 2019 and September 18,

2019. He received a written warning for attendance with his paystub on September 30, 2019. He was placed on probation at that time.

Claimant was a no-call/no-show on November 14, 2019 and November 16, 2019. He telephoned the restaurant on November 18, 2019 and spoke to Mr. Poonja about his schedule. Mr. Poonja informed him that he was scheduled to work at 4:00 p.m. that day, November 18, 2019, and that he has already received more than three attendance issues. He was verbally warned that his job was in jeopardy if he failed to come to work on November 18, 2019 at 4:00 p.m. Claimant did not show up for his scheduled shift on November 18, 2019. Claimant was discharged thereafter for his attendance violations.

The administrative records establish that the claimant has received unemployment insurance benefits of \$2,100.00 from November 17, 2019 through February 8, 2020. The employer participated in the fact-finding interview by telephone.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct. Benefits are denied effective November 17, 2019.

As a preliminary matter, I find that Claimant did not quit. Claimant was discharged from employment for job-related misconduct.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2) a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1) a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith

errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. *Id.* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Id.* at 558.

Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 or because it was not "properly

reported.” *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 (Iowa 1984) and *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). Excused absences are those “with appropriate notice.” *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982).

The term “absenteeism” also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as “tardiness.” An absence is an extended tardiness and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 190 (Iowa 1984). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping is not considered excused. *Id.* at 191. Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10-11 (Iowa 1982). Absences in good faith, for good cause, with appropriate notice, are not misconduct. *Id.* at 10. They may be grounds for discharge but not for disqualification of benefits because substantial disregard for the employer’s interest is not shown and this is essential to a finding of misconduct. *Id.* Excessive absenteeism has been found when there have been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. See *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982).

The claimant had six unexcused absences in a two-month period of time. This is excessive. The employer has established that the claimant was warned that further unexcused absences could result in termination of employment and the final incident on November 18, 2019 was not excused. The final absence, in combination with the claimant’s history of unexcused absenteeism, amounts to job-related misconduct. Benefits are denied effective November 17, 2019. Because benefits are denied, the issue of overpayment and chargeability must be addressed.

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) a-b provides in part:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.

a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

b. (1) (a) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer’s account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5. The employer shall not be relieved of charges if benefits are paid because the employer or an agent of the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department’s request for information relating to the payment of benefits. This prohibition against relief of charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers.

(b) However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to

section 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides in part:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

(1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if unrebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—sub rule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.

Because the claimant's separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which he was not entitled. The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for those benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The employer will not be charged for benefits if it is determined that they did participate in the fact-finding interview. Iowa Code § 96.3(7).

In this case, the claimant has received benefits but was not eligible for those benefits. Since the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview, the claimant is obligated to repay to the agency the benefits he received in connection with this employer's account after his disqualifying separation from employment, and this employer's account shall not be charged for benefits after the separation from employment, which was effective benefit week beginning November 17, 2019.

DECISION:

The January 24, 2020 (reference 05) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for job-related misconduct on November 18, 2019. Unemployment insurance benefits are denied the benefit-week beginning November 17, 2019

and until claimant has worked in and earned wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount after his separation date, and provided he is otherwise eligible. The claimant has been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits of \$2,100.00 from November 17, 2019 through February 8, 2020 and is obligated to repay the agency those benefits. The employer participated in the fact-finding interview and its account shall not be charged for benefits paid after November 17, 2019.

Dawn Boucher
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

db/scn