IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

TODD E LANDIS Claimant

APPEAL 21A-UI-23399-ED-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

HUMMEL'S NISSAN Employer

> OC: 09/05/21 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant filed an appeal from the October 19, 2021, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon his separation from Hummel's Nissan. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on December 13, 2021. The claimant, Todd Landis, participated personally and was represented by attorney, Stuart Higgins. The employer, Hummels Nissan, participated through Randy Kirchoff. No exhibits were offered or admitted. f

ISSUES:

Did claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to employer? Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as a commercial sales manager from August 2014, until his employment ended on September 3, 2021. Claimant's job duties were to sell Nissan vans, trucks and cars, to prospect, order, and clean vehicles for delivery purposes. In this position, claimant received a set salary of \$60,000 per year plus commissions totaling \$140,000 to \$150,000. On August 31, 2021, Mr. Kirchoff called the claimant to a meeting. At this meeting, claimant was told his position was being terminated because Nissan was no longer making its vans. The position was to be eliminated immediately at the end of the week. Claimant was instructed to turn in his demo vehicle that he was driving to and from work. Claimant was offered to sell cars, but there was no salary and no demo in the car salesperson position offered. Claimant did not respond to the offer, but turned in his demo car per Mr. Kirchoff's instructions and stopped reporting to work after the end date of his commercial sales manager position.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

As a preliminary matter, I find that the Claimant did not quit. Claimant was discharged from employment.

lowa Code §96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(21) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(21) The claimant was compelled to resign when given the choice of resigning or being discharged. This shall not be considered a voluntary leaving.

lowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989).

A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (lowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the lowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (lowa Ct. App. 1992).

Claimant was told that his position as commercial sales manager was being eliminated due to Nissan no longer making vans. Claimant was offered a new position that was substantially different from his commercial sales manager position. Claimant would have been required to move offices and take a position that had no salary and was based only on commissions. Claimant did not intend on resigning. However, his job as commercial salesperson was eliminated and the only job left for him was substantially different in salary and benefits than his commercial sales manager position. If he did not accept the lower level sales position, he would be discharged. Claimant did not intend to quit. This is not a voluntary quitting by claimant but rather a discharge case.

Further, the employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa Ct. App. 1988).

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not

disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (lowa Ct. App. 1986). Further, poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa Ct. App. 1988). The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (lowa 2000).

There must be a current act of misconduct to disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits. In this case, there was none. Both claimant and employer testified that the claimant's position was eliminated because Nissan stopped making vans, not because of anything the claimant did. Without a current act of misconduct, the employer failed to meet its burden of proof of establishing disqualifying job misconduct. As such, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The October 19, 2021, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. Any benefits claimed and withheld on this basis shall be paid.

Emily Drenkow Ca

Emily Drenkow Carr Administrative Law Judge Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau 1000 East Grand Avenue Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209 Fax (515) 478-3528

January 13, 2022 Decision Dated and Mailed

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