

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

<p><b>DENISE A DODD</b> Claimant</p> <p><b>ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL</b> Employer</p>	<p>68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI</p> <p><b>APPEAL NO: 06A-UI-10536-LT</b></p> <p><b>ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION</b></p> <p><b>OC: 10-01-06 R: 03</b> <b>Claimant: Appellant (2)</b></p>
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Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The claimant filed a timely appeal from the October 24, 2006, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on November 13, 2006. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Sarah Brunner and Beverly Meester.

**ISSUE:**

The issue is whether claimant was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time third shift charge nurse from February 21, 2005 until September 28, 2006 when she was discharged. On September 26, claimant did not use her name badge to clock in but filled out a blue slip noting arrival and departure times. She was scheduled to work from 10:15 p.m. to 6:45 a.m. She arrived at work about 10:50 p.m. according to Mindy Savage, second shift charge nurse and second shift CNA Karla Tray. She was tardy because her alarm clock did not go off and notified Savage she would be at work as soon as possible. She was still there the following morning at 7:30 a.m. when Brunner arrived and Meester said hello to her at 7:45 a.m. Claimant recorded her work hours as “10 to 6” and had joked with Savage she would bring her pizza, which she sometimes does.

Other disciplinary measures were unrelated to attendance. Employer policy calls for discharge on a first offense of falsification of time records. Her job was not in jeopardy for attendance or overtime.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Employment Appeal Board*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job-related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. While employer does have a

legitimate interest in keeping accurate time records for a multitude of reasons, this conduct was merely an isolated incident of poor judgment and inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about this issue, in spite of the policy, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Benefits are allowed.

**DECISION:**

The October 24, 2006, reference 01, decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

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Dévon M. Lewis  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

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