IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

JAY E HEPNER Claimant

APPEAL 15A-UI-03794-H2T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

FIRSTFLEET INC Employer

> OC: 02/22/15 Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the March 17, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on April 29, 2015. Claimant participated. Employer participated through (representative) Bill McGuire, Terminal Manager and John Harriman, Regional Operations Manager.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged due to job-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as a transportation supervisor beginning on March 10, 2014 through February 20, 2015 when he was discharged.

The employer has a handbook or policy manual that provides employees will be given progressive discipline. On October 31 2014, the claimant and his supervisor had a discussion that indicated he was not meeting the employer's expectations. The claimant was lacking in communication skills, computer skills and overall dealing with customers and the drivers. The claimant performed to the best of his ability but was simply unable to ever meet the employer's expectations. There was no specific final incident that led to the claimant's discharge. He simply continued to struggle in areas of communication, customer service and 'making the driver's happy.' The claimant was never given any warning (final or otherwise) that his job was in jeopardy. He did not know that if he did not change his behavior he would be discharged. The claimant was not intentionally trying to fail at the job.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

871 IAC 24.32(8) provides:

Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based upon such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based upon a current act. Here the employer cannot pinpoint any final current specific act of misconduct.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351

N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Employment Appeal Board*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

Failure in job performance due to inability or incapacity is not considered misconduct because the actions were not volitional. *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979). Where an individual is discharged due to a failure in job performance, proof of that individual's ability to do the job is required to justify disqualification, rather than accepting the employer's subjective view. To do so is to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the claimant. *Kelly v. IDJS*, 386 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa App. 1986). Since employer agreed that claimant had never had a sustained period of time during which he performed his job duties to employer's satisfaction and inasmuch as he did attempt to perform the job to the best of his ability but was unable to meet the employer's expectations, no intentional misconduct has been established, as is the employer's burden of proof. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). Accordingly, no disqualification pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a is imposed.

DECISION:

The March 17, 2015 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

Teresa K. Hillary Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

tkh/css