IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

NEIL E CARR

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 12A-UI-02986-S2T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

JACOBSON STAFFING COMPANY

Employer

OC: 11/27/11

Claimant: Respondent (1/R)

Section 96.5-1-j – Separation from Temporary Employer

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Jacobson Staffing Company (employer) appealed a representative's March 16, 2012 decision (reference 01) that concluded Neil Carr (claimant) was eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on April 9, 2012. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated by Danielle Aeschliman, Operations Manager.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether the claimant was separated from employment for any disqualifying reason.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: The employer is a temporary employment service. The claimant performed services from January 3 through 9, 2010, for Jacobson Warehouse in Grinnell, Iowa. He signed a document on December 14, 2011, indicating that he was to contact the employer within three days following the completion of an assignment to request placement in a new assignment. The claimant was given a copy of the document which was part of the contract for hire.

On January 9, 2012, the claimant was operating a forklift and noticed that the employer had recently changed the directional signage. He stopped and turned his forklift around. In doing so he tore open two bags filled with seed that were going to be discarded. The employer told the claimant he was to be drug tested. The claimant submitted to testing and the results were negative. The employer notified the claimant that he was discharged for the incident of January 9, 2012, and for company cutbacks. The employer did not issue the claimant any warnings during his employment.

The claimant completed his last assignment on January 9, 2012, and sought reassignment from the employer. The employer offered the claimant work 23 miles away from his residence at Jacobson Warehouse in Newton, Iowa. The claimant refused the offer because of the commuting distance.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was not separated from the employer for any disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, but the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

For the purposes of this paragraph:

- (1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.
- (2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

Under the Iowa Code the employer must advise the claimant of the three-day notice requirement and give the claimant a copy of that requirement. The notice requirement cannot be a part of the contract for hire. In this case, the notice requirement was part of the contract for hire. The employer did not provide the claimant with the proper notice requirements and has, therefore, failed to satisfy the requirements of Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-j.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about any of the issues leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or negligently in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. The employer did not provide sufficient evidence of job-related misconduct. The employer did not meet its burden of proof to show misconduct. Benefits are allowed.

The issue of whether the claimant refused suitable work is remanded for determination.

DECISION:

The r	representat	tive's	March 1	16, 2	2012	decisio	on ((referen	ce 01)	is	affirmed	l. The	claim	ant	was
separ	rated from	the en	nployer	for o	good	cause	attri	ibutable	to the	en	nployer.	Benefits	are	allov	wed.
The is	ssue of whe	ether t	he clain	nani	t refus	sed sui	tabl	le work	is rema	and	led for de	etermina	tion.		

Beth A. Scheetz Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

bas/pjs