IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

DEBORAH G TAPLIN Claimant

APPEAL 15A-UI-00635-JCT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

BRAD DEERY MOTORS

Employer

OC: 12/21/14 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the January 8, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon her separation. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on February 10, 2015. The claimant participated. The employer participated through Chris Nelson and Joel Kilburg was an observer.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as an internet salesperson and was separated from employment on December 23, 2014, when she was discharged.

On December 20, 2014, the claimant was working with a co-worker named Brandy Brennan. During her shift, there was discussion regarding an internet sales lead and whether the claimant was entitled to be associated with the sales lead based on her prior history. Mr. Nelson received a phone call from both the claimant and Ms. Brennan wanting to discuss the exchange. The employer testified the claimant said to Ms. Brennan, "I can do whatever the fuck I want" and "why the fuck would you do that?" The claimant denied making the statements to Ms. Brennan. Mr. Nelson was not present during the exchange between the claimant and Ms. Brennan. He further acknowledged he had never personally witnessed the claimant use profanity towards another employee.

Prior to the claimant's separation, she had been counseled for exchanges with other co-workers as well as for being tardy in November 2014, but did not know her job was in jeopardy. The employer did not provide copies of any disciplinary action for the hearing.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and the employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. Schmitz v. lowa Dep't Human Servs., 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. Schmitz, 461 N.W.2d at 608. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. Crosser v. lowa Dep't of Pub. Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Mr. Nelson had no first-hand testimony about the final incident or prior incidents that led to the claimant's discharge. The claimant denied using profanity at another employee or knowing her job was in jeopardy. Mindful of the ruling in Crosser, id., and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer. The employer has not met its burden of proof to establish a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined.

Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as a condemnation of the employer's right to terminate the claimant for violating its policies and procedures. The employer had a right to follow its policies and procedures. The analysis of unemployment insurance eligibility, however, does not end there. This ruling simply holds that the employer did not prove that the claimant had the requisite level of intent or negligence for her conduct to qualify as misconduct under lowa law. The employer has not met its burden of proof and benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The January 8, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Jennifer L. Coe Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jlc/pjs