

IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

TIMOTHY T STOKES
1311 VANDENBURG CR
SERGEANT BLUFFS IA 51054

SABRE COMMUNICATIONS CORP
PO BOX 658
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SIOUX CITY IA 51102-0658

Appeal Number: 04A-UI-12603-DT
OC: 09/05/04 R: 01
Claimant: Appellant (2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.**

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge
Section 96.5-1 – Voluntary Leaving
Section 96.7-2-a(2) – Charges Against Employer's Account

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Timothy T. Stokes (claimant) appealed a representative's November 16, 2004 decision (reference 03) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Sabre Communications Corporation (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on December 16, 2004. The claimant participated in the hearing and presented testimony from one other witness, Jennifer Stokes. Maria Harder appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, Harry Foote. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct? Is the employer's account subject to charge?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on September 20, 2004. He worked full time as a temporary welder in the employer's wireless communication tower manufacturing business. His regular work schedule was from 5:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. His last day of work was October 23, 2004.

The claimant was absent on October 25, October 26, and October 27, 2004. On each of these days, the claimant attempted to call in and report he would be absent due to illness; he called the appropriate number, and he believed in good faith that he had successfully left a message on the employer's answering system. However, the employer did not get the messages that the claimant had called in, and considered him a no-call/no-show. On October 27, the claimant's supervisor, Mr. Foote, called the claimant's home and learned that he was homesick. Mr. Foote indicated that the claimant's job was being terminated for the claimant being a three-day no-call/no-show. The claimant had not been informed that there was anything he needed to do to ensure that the employer had gotten his call-in messages or that the employer had a three-day no-call/no-show job abandonment policy.

The claimant established an unemployment insurance benefit year effective September 5, 2004. He filed an additional claim effective October 24, 2004.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

871 IAC 24.25 provides that, in general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. Bartelt v. Employment Appeal Board, 494 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1993). The employer asserted that the claimant was not discharged but that he abandoned his job by being a no-call/no-show for over three days. The claimant asserted that he did not abandon his job, and had called in on each of the days. He was not on notice of the employer's no-call/no-show policy. As of the third day, the employer specifically knew that the claimant was absent due to illness, not because he was intending to quit. The administrative law judge concludes that the employer has failed to satisfy its burden that the claimant voluntarily quit. Iowa Code §96.6-2. As the separation was not a voluntary quit, it must be treated as a discharge for purposes of unemployment insurance. 871 IAC 24.26(21).

The issue in this case is then whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 1. The employer's interest, or
 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
 - a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a, (7) provide:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of

recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The reason the employer effectively discharged the claimant was the belief that he had abandoned his job because of his absence from work. Absenteeism can constitute misconduct, however, to be misconduct, absences must be both excessive and unexcused. A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline for the absence under its attendance policy. Cosper, supra. In this case, the employer asserts that the reason for the final absence was not properly reported. However, it is clear that the claimant's failure to effectively report his absence was not volitional, as he believed he had successfully left a message for the employer. Before the separation, the employer knew that the absence was due to the claimant's illness. Floyd v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 338 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa App. 1983). The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

The final issue is whether the employer's account is subject to charge. An employer's account is only chargeable if the employer is a base period employer. Iowa Code § 96.7. The base period is "the period beginning with the first day of the five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual's benefit year and ending with the last day of the next to the last completed calendar quarter immediately preceding the date on which the individual filed a valid claim." Iowa Code §96.19-3. The claimant's base period began April 1, 2003 and ended March 31, 2004. The employer did not employ the claimant during this time, and therefore the employer is not currently a base period employer and its account is not currently chargeable for benefits paid to the claimant.

DECISION:

The representative's November 16, 2004 decision (reference 03) is reversed. The claimant did not voluntarily quit and the employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account is not subject to charge in the current benefit year.

ld/b