

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

KATRINA C JAMES
Claimant

APPEAL 17A-UI-06771-JCT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

ATLANTIC COMMUNITY SCHOOLS
Employer

**OC: 05/28/17
Claimant: Respondent (2)**

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal
Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the June 23, 2017, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on July 21, 2017. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated through Emily McLaren, payroll secretary. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records including the fact-finding documents. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Is the appeal timely?
Did the claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to the employer?
Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?
Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A representative's unemployment insurance decision allowing benefits to the claimant was mailed to the employer's last known address of record on June 23, 2017. Ms. McLaren received the decision on June 27, 2017, within the appeal period. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by July 3, 2017. The appeal was not filed until July 5, 2017 (Department Exhibit D-1), which is after the date noticed on the unemployment insurance decision.

The employer first attempted to file its appeal online by following the instructions on the notice of the initial decision. She received a message at the completion of entering information and uploading her attachment that made her believe the appeal was submitted. She did not receive

an email confirmation and a few days later, called IWD for guidance, who recommended she file again. She filed again on approximately June 29, 2017, and again did not get a confirmation email so she called IWD again, who advised her to try to file an appeal by paper. Ms. McLaren filed a third time by fax and it was received.

The claimant was employed part-time as a para-educator and was separated from employment on May 27, 2017, when she quit the employment. Continuing work was available.

Upon the claimant accepting her position as a para-educator, the claimant learned obtaining her para-education certification would be required to continue employment. The claimant did not raise concerns about the course being a change in the contract for which she was hired. No cutoff or deadline was given to the claimant for completion, and classes are offered approximately every six or nine months. The claimant was unable to afford the class in August 2016 when hired, because the cost was \$600.00. The employer does not pay for the certification. On April 27, 2017, the claimant tendered her resignation, effective May 26, 2017, because she determined she would be unable to take the June course due to financial constraints. The claimant did not make any application to transfer to a position not requiring the certification.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has received unemployment benefits in the amount of \$581.00, since filing a claim with an effective date of May 28, 2017. The administrative record also establishes that the employer did not participate in the June 21, 2017 fact-finding interview or make a witness with direct knowledge available for rebuttal. The reason the employer did not participate is that the employer did not receive the notice of fact-finding in the mail until the same day the initial decision arrived.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow the administrative law judge concludes the employer's appeal is timely.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and

benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from unemployment insurance decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982).

The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). In this case, the employer made two attempts within the prescribed period to file its appeal online; on June 27 and June 29, 2017. After the employer did not receive a confirmation email after either, it contacted IWD within a reasonable time for guidance before a third attempt via fax on July 5, 2017 was successful. The appellant's attempt to file an appeal in a timely manner was thwarted by technical issues related to the website being inoperable, and was not due to delay by the party. The appeal was filed within a reasonable time thereafter. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

The next issue is whether the claimant quit the employment for good cause reasons under Iowa law.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(27) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(27) The claimant left rather than perform the assigned work as instructed.

In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer. See 871 IAC 24.25. "Good cause" for leaving employment must be that which is reasonable to the average person, not the overly sensitive individual or the claimant in particular. *Uniweld Products v. Industrial Relations Commission*, 277 So.2d 827 (Fla. App. 1973). "The term encompasses real circumstances, adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason, just grounds for the action, and always the element of good faith." *Wiese v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 389 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 1986) "[C]ommon sense and prudence must be exercised in evaluating all of the circumstances that lead to an employee's quit in order to attribute the cause for the termination." *Id.*

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.* After assessing the credibility of the claimant who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the administrative law judge finds the weight of the evidence in the record fails to establish the claimant has met her burden of proof to establish she quit for good cause reasons within Iowa law.

The credible evidence presented is the claimant was made aware at the time of hire, that she would need to obtain a para-educator certification as a condition for employment, at her expense. The employer did not give the claimant a deadline or warn her that her job was in jeopardy. The claimant had nine months between when she learned of the requirement until the next available class, to make arrangements to attend the course, if she wanted to remain in the position. Alternately, the claimant could have applied for other positions within the district that did not require certification, but she did not. Rather, the claimant tendered her resignation on April 27, 2017, one month in advance, to alert the employer she would not return after the school year (Department Exhibit D-1). No evidence supports the claimant would have been discharged had she not completed the June course. Therefore based on the evidence presented, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's leaving the employment may have been based upon good personal reasons, but it was not for a good-cause reason attributable to the employer according to Iowa law. Benefits must be denied.

Iowa Code § 96.3(7)a-b provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.

a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

b. (1) (a) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding § 96.8, subsection 5. The employer shall not be relieved of charges if benefits are paid because the employer or an agent of the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. This prohibition against relief of charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers.

(b) However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to § 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment.

(2) An accounting firm, agent, unemployment insurance accounting firm, or other entity that represents an employer in unemployment claim matters and demonstrates a continuous pattern of failing to participate in the initial determinations to award benefits, as determined and defined by rule by the department, shall be denied permission by the department to represent any employers in unemployment insurance matters. This subparagraph does not apply to attorneys or counselors admitted to practice in the courts of this state pursuant to § 602.10101.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

(1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if unrebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.

(2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an

entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.

(3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19.

(4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual," as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code section 96.3(7)"b" as amended by 2008 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

Because the claimant's separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which she was not entitled. The claimant has been overpaid \$581.00 in unemployment insurance benefits. The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by claimant. Additionally, the employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview. Thus, the claimant is not obligated to repay to the agency the benefits she received.

The law also states that an employer is to be charged if "the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. . ." Iowa Code § 96.3(7)(b)(1)(a). Here, the employer did not receive the notice of fact-finding interview in advance of the call and was unaware of the interview. Benefits were not paid because the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to IWD's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. Instead, benefits were paid because the employer did not receive notice of fact-finding interview, through no fault of its own. The employer thus cannot be charged. Since neither party is to be charged then the overpayment is absorbed by the fund.

DECISION:

The June 23, 2017, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant voluntarily left the employment without good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible.

The claimant has been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits in the amount of \$581.00 and is not obligated to repay the agency those benefits. The employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview through no fault of its own and its account shall not be charged. The overpayment must be charged to the fund.

Jennifer L. Beckman
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn