IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

MICHAEL L KERNS

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 09A-UI-06882-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DECISION

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC

Employer

OC: 03/29/09

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.5-1 – Voluntary Leaving

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Michael L. Kerns (claimant)) appealed a representative's April 22, 2009 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on June 1, 2009. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer's representative received the hearing notice and responded by calling the Appeals Section on May 29, 2009. The representative indicated that Ryan Smith would be available at the scheduled time for the hearing at a specified telephone number. However, when the administrative law judge called that number at the scheduled time for the hearing, neither Mr. Smith nor any replacement witness was available; therefore, the employer did not participate in the hearing. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on September 15, 2008. He worked full time as maintenance mechanic on a 5:45 p.m. to 6:15 a.m. schedule starting Sunday evening and ending Thursday morning. His last day of work was March 30, 2009. He was suspended on that date. On April 1 he was informed that his job was terminated due to job abandonment.

On Sunday, March 29 the claimant reported for his shift that evening as scheduled. His prior supervisor was no longer working for the employer, and he found he was working under a supervisor with whom he had prior problems. At various times during the evening the supervisor would yell and swear at the claimant. At approximately 8:30 p.m. the supervisor was discussing work he was assigning the claimant; the work was in an area near the roof. The ventilation fans in the area were not working, resulting in the area being foggy and slippery, too

dangerous to work in. The fans were being repaired, and the claimant asked the supervisor what he should be doing while the fans were being fixed. The supervisor replied that he guessed the claimant would have to just stand there and be "f - - - ing stupid." The claimant then told the supervisor that he could not continue to work with him like this without conferring with human resources. Since there was no human resources person there that evening, he was leaving and would come back to talk with human resources the next day.

When the claimant came in the next day he went to human resources and related what had happened. He was told that he should not have left as he did, and was being suspended pending further investigation of the matter. When he returned on April 1, he was told again that the employer believed he should not have left on March 29, and that he was deemed to have abandoned his job by leaving.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits if he quit the employment without good cause attributable to the employer or was discharged for work-connected misconduct. lowa Code §§ 96.5-1; 96.5-2-a.

Rule 871 IAC 24.25 provides that, in general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship and an action to carry out that intent. Bartelt v. Employment Appeal Board, 494 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1993); Wills v. Employment Appeal Board, 447 N.W.2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989). The employer asserted that the claimant was not discharged but that he quit by job abandonment. Expressing an intention to leave until a matter can be discussed with other authorities within the company does not demonstrate the requisite intent to quit. Peck v. EAB, 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa App. 1992). The administrative law judge concludes that the employer has failed to satisfy its burden that the claimant voluntarily quit. Iowa Code § 96.6-2. As the separation was not a voluntary quit, it must be treated as a discharge for purposes of unemployment insurance. 871 IAC 24.26(21); Peck, supra.

The issue in this case is then whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct

must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984).

The reason the employer effectively discharged the claimant was his leaving work due to the harassment by the supervisor. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's April 22, 2009 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The claimant did not voluntarily quit and the employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs