# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**MARTIN CHAPA** 

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 07A-UI-04531-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

**DECISION** 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC

Employer

OC: 04/01/07 R: 03 Claimant: Appellant (1)

Section 96.6-2 - Timeliness of Appeal

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Martin Chapa (claimant) appealed a representative's April 20, 2007 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 22, 2007. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer failed to respond to the hearing notice and provide a telephone number at which a witness or representative could be reached for the hearing and did not participate in the hearing. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

### ISSUE:

Was the claimant's appeal timely or are there legal grounds under which it can be treated as timely?

## **FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on April 20, 2007. The claimant received the decision on or about April 24, 2007. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by April 30, 2007. The appeal was not filed until it was postmarked on May 3, 2007, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. The reason for the delay was that the claimant initially had decided not to appeal as he was just going to find new employment and move on, but subsequently decided he wished to appeal to make a statement that might benefit other employees.

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

If a party fails to make a timely appeal of a representative's decision and there is no legal excuse under which the appeal can be deemed to have been made timely, the decision as to the merits has become final and is not subject to further review.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976). Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. <u>Messina v. IDJS</u>, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (lowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (lowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (lowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (lowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (lowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

## 871 IAC 24.35(2) provides in pertinent part:

The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the department that the delay in submission was due to department error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service or its successor.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2) or other factors outside the appellant's control. The administrative law judge further concludes that because the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6-2, the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal, regardless of whether the merits of the appeal would be valid. See, <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979); <u>Franklin</u>, supra; and <u>Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

## **DECISION:**

The representative's April 20, 2007 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative has become final and remains in full force and effect. Benefits are withheld until such time as the claimant has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs