IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

NATHAN M SOAT Claimant

APPEAL 15A-UI-11271-JCT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

AMERICAN CUSTOMER CARE INC

Employer

OC: 09/13/15 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the September 30, 2015 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon separation. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on October 23, 2015. The claimant participated personally and was represented by Benjamin Ruffcorn, Attorney at Law. The employer participated through Christine Dubrow, payroll administrator. No documents were offered or admitted into evidence.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full time as a team leader and was separated from employment on September 14, 2015; when he was discharged by Kelli Martin.

The employer uses an internal instant messenger application, called Spark, which allows employees to communicate back and forth at the work place. Conversations can be monitored and retrieved by the employer. Employees are made aware that the application is for work related conversations only and employees are expected to conduct themselves professionally, on and off the Spark application. The claimant was previously issued a written warning in July 2015, for being observed having a non-work-related conversation via the Spark instant messenger system. The claimant was aware his job was in jeopardy.

The employer reported the final incident triggering separation was a Spark conversation between the claimant and one of his team members, Ayesha Bailey. Ms. Bailey contacted the claimant via Spark to discuss paperwork for her daycare that needed the corporate office's attention. In the course of the conversation, the claimant made a comment "I need mah papers, gagaga" followed by "I'm sorry that corporate is slow." The claimant did not intend to mock corporate or Ms. Bailey by the comment. On September 14, 2015, the claimant was informed he was being discharged for unprofessionalism displayed within the messages. The employer

did not elaborate what he said that warranted his immediate discharge and did not provide a witness who made the decision to discharge the claimant. The employer also did not supply a copy of the employer's applicable policy or transcript of the message at hand.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) and (8) provide:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and the employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was unprofessional in his Spark message to Ms. Bailey on September 10, 2015. The employer witness was not involved in the decision to discharge the claimant and unable at the hearing to ascertain or determine what exactly the claimant said in the Spark message triggered the discharge, why it was determined to be unprofessional, and why it warranted immediate discharge instead of a lesser penalty.

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs., 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. Schmitz, 461 N.W.2d at 608. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Without seeing the conversation itself, in its entirety, and based on the one sentence read into the record by Ms. Budrow, the administrative law judge is not persuaded the comment "I need mah papers, gagaga" is unprofessional or so egregious to warrant immediate discharge. In contrast, the claimant's testimony was that he was engaged in a work-related conversation with Ms. Bailey, and had no intent of mocking anyone or being unprofessional. Mindful of the ruling in Crosser, id., and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is

more credible than that of the employer. The employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

While the employer may have been justified in discharging the claimant, work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law has not been established in this case. Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as a condemnation of the employer's right to terminate the claimant for violating its policies and procedures. The employer had a right to follow its policies and procedures. The analysis of unemployment insurance eligibility, however, does not end there. This ruling simply holds that the employer did not meet its burden of proof to establish the claimant's conduct leading separation was misconduct under lowa law. Since the employer has not met its burden of proof, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The September 30, 2015 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. The benefits claimed and withheld shall be paid, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Jennifer L. Coe Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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