

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

SHERMANDO CAMPBELL
Claimant

BLACKHAWK SERVICES CORP
Employer

APPEAL 21A-UI-15218-SN-T
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 04/11/21
Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the June 23, 2021, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon he was excessively absent. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on August 27, 2021. The claimant participated. The employer participated through Human Resources Manager Laurey Gray and was represented by Unemployment Claims Specialist Annie Gonzalez. Exhibit D-1, D-2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were received into the record.

ISSUES:

Whether the claimant's appeal is timely? Whether there are reasonable grounds to consider it otherwise timely due to circumstances beyond his control?

Whether the claimant's separation from employer is disqualifying?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

A disqualification decision was mailed to claimant's last known address of record on June 22, 2021. The claimant did receive the decision within ten days. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by July 2, 2021. (Exhibit D-1) The appeal was not filed until July 7, 2021, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. (Exhibit D-2)

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The administrative law judge determines the claimant's appeal is untimely. He further concludes that the claimant's appeal was not delayed due to circumstances beyond his control. In this context, the administrative law judge has determined he does not have jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the claimant's appeal.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of issuing the notice of the filing of the claim to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. All interested parties shall select a format as specified by the department to receive such notifications. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was issued, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The decision in this case rests, at least in part, on the credibility of the witnesses. It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether


the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. The administrative law judge does not believe the claimant's allegation on the record that he received the decision on the same date he filed his appeal. The claimant gave inconsistent testimony regarding this point. At times, the claimant stated he received the decision a month prior to the hearing, and at other times he said that he received it a week prior to the hearing. Later in the hearing, the claimant attempted to excuse this testimony as mere confusion because he believed the administrative law judge was referring to the employer's exhibits. This explanation makes no sense because the administrative law judge repeatedly redirected his attention to the decision itself. At times, the claimant stated his receipt of the decision was delayed due to it not going to a PO Box because he had moved. He made this allegation after he had confirmed the address on the cover sheet was his address of record at the time. Finally, the claimant admitted on the record that he had no idea when he received the decision. However, the claimant then provided purely self-serving testimony that it must have been the same day he filed his appeal. This muddled and inconsistent testimony is not sufficient to override the presumption that the claimant received the decision on the date of mailing, June 22, 2021.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

DECISION:

The June 23, 2021, (reference 02), decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.



Sean M. Nelson
Administrative Law Judge

September 01, 2021
Decision Dated and Mailed