IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

STACIE L CRAWFORD PO BOX 103 CLARINDA IA 51632

MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL INC MANPOWER TEMPORARY SERVICES C/o TALX UC EXPRESS PO BOX 66864 ST LOUIS MO 63166-6864 Appeal Number: 06A-UI-03482-DT

OC: 02/27/05 R: 01 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)	
(Decision Dated & Mailed)	

Section 96.5-1-j – Temporary Employment 871 IAC 24.26(19) – Temporary Employment

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Manpower International, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's March 16, 2006 decision (reference 07) that concluded Stacie L. Crawford (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on April 13, 2006. The claimant participated in the hearing. Todd Ashenfelder appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, Harold Decuir. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The employer is a temporary staffing agency. The claimant began taking assignments through the employer on August 14, 2003. She began an assignment on November 11, 2005. She worked full time as an inspector in materials at the employer's Clarinda, Iowa, business client. Her last day on the assignment was December 6, 2005. She was injured on the job at that time.

She was released with some restrictions as of December 13, 2005. She could not return to the assignment with the restrictions, so the employer provided her with light duty in its own office. She also worked three hours on an assignment that was supposed to be light duty on or about January 30, 2006; she was reinjured on that assignment and her doctor took her back off all work.

On February 7, 2006, she was released by her doctor for full duty effective February 8, 2006. She contacted the employer on February 8, 2006, to seek to return to her prior assignment, although she indicated that she was still in a lot of pain. However, at that time, the employer informed her that there was no work available for her.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The essential question in this case is whether there was a disqualifying separation from employment.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

871 IAC 24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of lowa Code section 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of lowa Code section 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The intent of the statute is to avoid situations where a temporary assignment has ended and the claimant is unemployed, but the employer is unaware that the claimant is not working and could have been offered an available new assignment to avoid any liability for unemployment insurance benefits. Here, the employer was aware that the business client had no further work available for the claimant. The claimant sought another assignment upon being released, but no work was available at that time. The statute does not require that the claimant continue to seek reassignment after the initial opportunity to the employer to reemploy her. Benefits are allowed, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The representative's March 16, 2006 decision (reference 07) is affirmed. The claimant's separation was not a voluntary quit but was the completion of a temporary assignment. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

ld/kkf