

IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

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MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL INC
MANPOWER TEMPORARY SERVICES
C/O TALX UC EXPRESS
PO BOX 66864
ST LOUIS MO 63166-6864

Appeal Number: 06A-UI-02700-DT
OC: 02/05/06 R: 04
Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319**.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-1-j – Temporary Employment
871 IAC 24.26(19) – Temporary Employment

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Manpower International, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's February 22, 2006 decision (reference 01) that concluded Melissa A. Mays (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on April 7, 2006. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 06A-UI-02701-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. Sally Jacobs appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The employer is a temporary staffing agency. The claimant began taking assignments through the employer on April 26, 2005. Her first and only final assignment began that day. She worked full time as a customer service call center representative at the employer's business client through February 4, 2006. The assignment ended as of that date because the business client determined to end the assignment due to attendance and low production issues. The business client informed the employer of the ending of the assignment on or about April 6, 2006, and the employer's representative informed the claimant the same day.

The claimant had missed numerous days from work; all but one, July 29, 2005, were due to personal illness or injury, including her final absence, January 18, 2006. She had not received any attendance warnings. The claimant had been warned due to two performance issues relating to leaving her phone in an incorrect status on November 22, 2005, and knew that her production numbers were low; however, in discussion with her supervisor in late January 2006, the supervisor noted that the claimant was showing continuing improvement.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The essential question in this case is whether there was a disqualifying separation from employment.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

871 IAC 24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of Iowa Code section 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of Iowa Code section 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The intent of the statute is to avoid situations where a temporary assignment has ended and the claimant is unemployed, but the employer is unaware that the claimant is not working and could have been offered an available new assignment to avoid any liability for unemployment insurance benefits. Where a temporary employment assignment has ended and the employer is aware of the end of that assignment, the employer is on "notice" that the assignment is ended and the claimant is available for a new assignment. Here, the employer was aware that the business client had ended the assignment; it considered the claimant's assignment to have been ended, albeit unsatisfactorily.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an

intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

871 IAC 24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Absenteeism can constitute misconduct; however, to be misconduct, absences must be both excessive and unexcused. A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline for the absence under its attendance policy. Cosper, supra. Because the final absence was related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed. Further, there is no showing of a current act of misconduct as required to establish work-connected misconduct. 871 IAC 24.32(8); Greene v. Employment Appeal Board, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa App. 1988). The final absence in question occurred several weeks prior to the employer's termination of the claimant's assignment, and there was no showing of a recent performance problem.

The separation is deemed to be a completion of a temporary assignment and not a voluntary leaving; a refusal of an offer of a new assignment would be a separate potentially disqualifying issue. Benefits are allowed, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The representative's February 22, 2006 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The claimant's separation was not a voluntary quit but was the completion of a temporary assignment. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

ld/kkf