JACOB M MORRISON
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 14A-UI-13013-JTT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

FIVE STAR QUALITY CARE INC
Employer
OC: 11/16/14
Claimant: Appellant (1)
Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) - Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code Section 96.6(2) - Timeliness of Appeal

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Jacob Morrison filed an appeal from the December 5, 2014, reference 01, decision that disqualified him for benefits and that relieved the employer of liability for benefits, based on an Agency conclusion that Mr. Morrison had been discharged for misconduct on November 17, 2014. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on January 14, 2015. Mr. Morrison participated. Darlene Brown represented the employer. Department Exhibits D-1 and D-2 were received into evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether the appeal was timely. Whether there is good cause to treat the appeal as timely.

## FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: on December 5, 2014, Iowa Workforce Development mailed a copy of the reference 01 decision to Jacob Morrison's last-known address of record. That address belonged to Mr. Morrison's parents. The reference 01 decision disqualified Mr. Morrison for benefits and relieved the employer of liability for benefits, based on an Agency conclusion that Mr. Morrison had been discharged for misconduct on November 17, 2014. Mr. Morrison received the decision on December 8 or 9,2014 . The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked by December 15, 2014 or received by the Appeals Section at Workforce Development by that day. On December15, Mr. Morrison drafted an appeal. On that day, Mr. Morrison took his appeal to the Glenwood post office, but did so after the post office had closed and after the final mail pick up of the day. Mr. Morrison's appeal was postmarked December 16, 2014.

## REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

## Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date
of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5 , subsection 10 , and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5 , subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5 , subsection 1 , paragraphs "a" through " h ". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5 .

The ten-day deadline for appeal begins to run on the date Workforce Development mails the decision to the parties. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the Agency representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

An appeal submitted by mail is deemed filed on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it was received, or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion. See 871 AC 24.35(1)(a). See also Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (lowa 1983). An appeal submitted by any other means is deemed filed on the date it is received by the Unemployment Insurance Division of Iowa Workforce Development. See 871 IAC 24.35(1)(b).

If an appellant delivers his appeal to the United States Postal Service after the final mail pick up of the day so that the appeal cannot be postmarked the day it is delivered to the post office, the appeal is deemed filed the day it is actually postmarked and the late filing is attributable to the claimant, not the United States Postal Service. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Cedar Rapids v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990). Accordingly, Mr. Morrison's appeal was filed on December 16, 2014, the date of the postmark on the envelope in which the appeal was mailed.

The evidence in the record establishes that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a
representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (lowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. The evidence indicates that Mr. Morrison waited until the appeal due date to prepare an appeal and then delivered the appeal to the post office after the last mail pick up and too late for the appeal to be postmarked by the appeal due date. Mr. Morrison's appeal was filed beyond the deadline for appeal. The failure to file an appeal within the time prescribed by the lowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Workforce Development error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service. See 871 IAC 24.35(2). Because the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to lowa Code section 96.6(2), the claimant has failed to preserve his rights to challenge the reference 01 decision and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to disturb the reference 01 decision. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

## DECISION:

The December 5, 2014, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely. The decision that disqualified the claimant for benefits and that relieved the employer of liability for benefits, based on the November 17, 2014 discharge, remains in effect.

James E. Timberland<br>Administrative Law Judge

$\overline{\text { Decision Dated and Mailed }}$
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