IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

MARGARETT A LOVE

Claimant

APPEAL 16A-UI-09134-LJ-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

LUTHER CARE SERVICES

Employer

OC: 07/31/16

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quitting

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(23) - Serious Family Needs

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) - Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the August 16, 2016, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon a determination that claimant voluntarily quit her employment for personal reasons. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on September 8, 2016. The claimant, Margarett A. Love, participated. The employer, Luther Care Services, participated through Cathy Carr-Davis, executive assistant; Jenny Fermin-Reyes, director of food services; and Todd Richardson of Employers Unity represented the employer. Employer's Exhibits 1 through 3 was received and admitted into the record.

ISSUES:

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to the employer or did employer discharge the claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time, most recently as a lead dietary cook, from October 3, 2005, until March 31, 2016, when the employer discharged her from employment.

Claimant initially took intermittent FMLA leave in October 2015, due to her father's health concerns. She returned to work full-time on or about January 18, 2016, worked through February 10, 2016. At that time, she reported to Fermin-Reyes that she was taking additional leave related to her father's health. Fermin-Reyes testified that claimant told her she would let her know if and when she could return to work. Claimant did not fill out new FMLA paperwork at that time.

Claimant did not contact the employer after February 10. Fermin-Reyes attempted to contact her via telephone prior to the employer discharging her, but she was not able to reach her. Claimant testified that she knew her FMLA would run out at some point, but she was not prepared to return to work because her father still needed her assistance. Approximately one month ago, Carr-Davis contacted claimant to inquire about an overdue water bill. She did not mention that claimant was no longer employed.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant's separation from employment was without good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld.

The employer contends claimant voluntarily quit her job. Iowa Code §96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25 provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer: ...

(23) The claimant left voluntarily due to family responsibilities or serious family needs.

Claimant has the burden of proving that the voluntary leaving was for good cause attributable to the employer. Iowa Code § 96.6(2). "Good cause" for leaving employment must be that which is reasonable to the average person, not the overly sensitive individual or the claimant in particular. *Uniweld Products v. Indus. Relations Comm'n*, 277 So.2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). Here, the issue is not whether an individual has important personal reasons that require leaving employment. The issue is whether the decision to leave employment can be attributed to the employer. Claimant testified that she left her employment to care for her ill father. This is not a reason that can be fairly credited to the employer.

A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (lowa 1980). Here, claimant told Fermin-Reyes that she was leaving to take care of her father. She never had any meaningful contact with the employer after that date. While claimant's leaving the employment may have been based upon good personal reasons, it was not for a good-cause reason attributable to the employer according to lowa law. Benefits must be denied.

Alternatively, claimant's separation from employment can be viewed as a discharge from employment due to absenteeism. Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law."

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (lowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10.

FMLA provisions were enacted to protect an individual's employment, not to be used as a weapon by an employer against its employee. Likewise, an employee bears responsibility for compliance with FMLA terms and cooperative communication with the employer. Here, claimant ceased all communication with her employer after February 10. She did not provide them with any information about a possible return-to-work date, and Fermin-Reyes' attempts to reach her were unsuccessful. The administrative law judge finds that under this alternative analysis, claimant was discharged from employment due to excessive, unexcused absenteeism.

DECISION:

The August 16, 2016, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant separated from employment without good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Elizabeth A. Johnson

Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

lj/