IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

NICOLE MCDONALD

Claimant

APPEAL 20A-UI-01627-AD-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

CASEY'S MARKETING COMPANY

Employer

OC: 01/19/20

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quitting

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On February 21, 2020, Casey's Marketing Company (employer) filed an appeal from the February 14, 2020 (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that determined Nicole McDonald (claimant) was eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

A telephone hearing was held on March 11, 2020. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. Employer participated by Area Supervisor Wendy Schleisman. Claimant participated personally.

Official notice was taken of the administrative record.

ISSUE(S):

- I. Was the separation a layoff, discharge for misconduct, or voluntary quit without good cause?
- II. Was the claimant overpaid benefits? Should claimant repay benefits or should employer be charged due to employer participation in fact finding?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

Claimant worked for employer as a part-time cashier. Claimant's first day of employment was August 9, 2019. The last day claimant worked on the job was January 21, 2020. Claimant's immediate supervisor was Erica Lehman. Claimant separated from employment on January 21, 2020. Claimant was discharged by Lehman on that date for absenteeism.

Claimant was working on January 21 when she received word that her daughter was ill. Her daughter had recently had several head injuries and was suddenly experiencing blurry vision.

Claimant was deeply concerned about her daughter and asked Kitchen Manager Tony if she could leave to help her daughter. Tony told claimant she could leave. Claimant did not contact Lehman, as she was in a rush and concerned about her daughter.

Lehman called claimant later that day and informed her she was discharged for leaving her shift without permission. Claimant explained she had received permission from Tony to leave due to her daughter's medical emergency. Lehman confirmed with Tony that he had given her permission, but she informed claimant she was still discharged.

Employer has a no-fault attendance policy. Claimant received a correction action on January 3, 2020, due to her attendance. Claimant had missed her shifts on December 28 and 30 due to being diagnosed with influenza. She properly reported those absences and provided a doctor's note to employer. Claimant had no other absences between January 3 and January 21.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons set forth below, the February 14, 2020 (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that found claimant eligible for benefits is AFFIRMED. Claimant is eligible for benefits, so long as she meets all other eligibility requirements.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32 provides in relevant part:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer bears the burden of proving that a claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits because of substantial misconduct within the meaning of lowa Code section 96.5(2). *Myers v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 462 N.W.2d 734, 737 (lowa Ct. App. 1990). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa Ct. App. 1988).

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman, Id.* In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. *Newman, Id.*

When reviewing an alleged act of misconduct, the finder of fact may consider past acts of misconduct to determine the magnitude of the current act. *Kelly v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 386 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa Ct. App.1986). However, conduct asserted to be disqualifying misconduct must be both specific and current. *West v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 489 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1992); *Greene v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Because our unemployment compensation law is designed to protect workers from financial hardships when they become unemployed through no fault of their own, we construe the provisions "liberally to carry out its humane and beneficial purpose." *Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 570 N.W.2d 85, 96 (lowa 1997). "[C]ode provisions which operate to work a forfeiture of benefits are strongly construed in favor of the claimant." *Diggs v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 478 N.W.2d 432, 434 (lowa Ct. App. 1991).

In order to show misconduct due to absenteeism, the employer must establish the claimant had excessive absences that were unexcused. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness or injury cannot constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper, supra*; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984).

Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the absences were unexcused. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness are excused, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871- 24.32(7); *Cosper, supra*; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit, supra*. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins, supra*. However, a good faith inability to obtain childcare for a sick infant may be excused. *McCourtney v. Imprimis Tech., Inc.*, 465 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).

The second step in the analysis is to determine whether the unexcused absences were excessive. Excessive absenteeism has been found when there have been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable.

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

The administrative law judge finds claimant's testimony was more reliable than Schleisman's testimony. Factual disputes in the parties' testimony were resolved by the administrative law judge based on this finding. Claimant offered credible first-hand testimony of the relevant events at issue. Schleisman's testimony was not based on first-hand knowledge and she was often unable to provide requested information or rebut information offered by claimant. For example, Schleisman stated claimant had missed several other days but did not provide documentation of those absences and was unable to say the reason for the absences or whether they were properly reported. Schleisman was also unaware of the specifics of communications between claimant, Lehman, and Tony.

Employer has not carried its burden of proving claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits because of a current act of substantial misconduct within the meaning of lowa Code section 96.5(2).

Claimant left during a shift on January 21, 2020. This absence was for reasonable grounds, as it was due to her daughter's medical emergency. Claimant did not report this absence properly, reporting it to Kitchen Manager Tony rather than directly to Lehman. Claimant should have contacted Lehman. However, the circumstances and her report to Tony tend to mitigate her failure to report it properly. Furthermore, claimant's other absences – on December 28 and 30 – were properly reported and were due to illness. Those absences are therefore considered excused under applicable law. One unexcused absence is not excessive and does not constitute substantial job-related misconduct such that claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits, particularly in an emergency medical situation such as this.

II. Was the claimant overpaid benefits? Should claimant repay benefits and/or charge employer due to employer participation in fact finding?

Because the administrative law judge finds claimant is eligible for benefits, these issues need not be addressed.

DECISION:

The February 14, 2020 (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision is AFFIRMED. Claimant is eligible for benefits, provided she meets all other eligibility requirements.

Andrew B. Duffelmeyer
Administrative Law Judge
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau
1000 East Grand Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209
Fax (515) 478-3528

Decision Dated and Mailed

abd/rvs